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This paper investigates the economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act through a 
study of market reactions to legislative events related to the Act. I find that the cumulative 
abnormal return around all legislative events leading to the passage of the Act is significantly 
negative. I then examine the private benefits and costs of major provisions of the Act by 
investigating the cross-sectional variation in market reactions to the rulemaking events. 
Regression results are consistent with the hypothesis that shareholders consider both the 
restriction of nonaudit services and the provisions to enhance corporate governance costly to 
business. The results also show that Section 404 of SOX, which mandates an internal control 




Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 




In response to a number of high-profile scandals since late 2001, Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the Act or SOX hereafter) in July 2002 to enhance corporate governance 
and thereby restore public confidence. The Act has introduced significant changes in both 
management’s reporting responsibilities and the scope and nature of the responsibilities of the 
auditor. When President Bush signed the Act into law, he characterized it as “the most far-
reaching reform of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”
1 
The major provisions of the Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB), prohibited auditors from performing certain nonaudit services for their audit 
clients, imposed greater criminal penalties for corporate fraud, and called for more detailed and 
timely disclosure of financial information. Further, Section 404 of the Act required that 
management assess internal controls and that auditors report on the internal controls of their 
clients. By requiring more oversight, imposing greater penalties for misconduct, and dealing with 
potential conflicts of interest, the Act aims to prevent deceptive accounting and management 
misbehavior. 
However, despite the claimed benefits of SOX, it has been frequently noted that the Act 
and its swift passage was politically motivated (e.g., Hilzenrath et al., July 28, 2002, The 
Washington Post). As the Democrats planned to charge the Bush Administration for being soft 
on corporate scandals in the congressional election of November 2002, the Republicans were 
eager to ease the pressure by showing their determination to punish corporate malfeasance. Ever 
since the passage of the Act, the business community has expressed substantial concerns about its 
compliance costs. An August 2003 survey of executives by the CFO Magazine indicated that 
70% of the respondents did not believe the benefits of compliance justify its costs. Moreover, 
Financial Executives International (FEI) surveyed 217 public firms in March 2005 about the 
direct costs of complying with Section 404 of SOX. The survey finds that the average first-year 
                                                 
1 See President Bush’s speech at the signing ceremony of SOX (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07).  
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cost estimate is about $4.36 million for roughly 27,000 hours of internal work and 8,000 hours of 
external work, including an increase of 57% in audit fees. The survey also reveals that 94% of 
the respondents believe the costs of compliance exceed the benefits.  
While the out-of-pocket compliance costs are generally considered significant (Solomon 
et al., 2004, WSJ), they are likely swamped by the opportunity costs of resources and the 
potentially profound impact of SOX on business practices. The Wall Street Journal cited the 
chief accounting officer of General Motors to illustrate the opportunity costs that have not been 
quantified: “The real cost isn’t the incremental dollars, it is having people that should be focused 
on the business focused instead on complying with the details of the rules” (Solomon et al., 
January 2004, WSJ). In addition, the Act exposes executives to greater litigation risks and stiffer 
penalties. As a result, CEOs are likely to take less risky actions, consequently changing their 
business strategies and potentially reducing the value of their firms (Ribstein, 2002).  
The overall direct and indirect private costs of SOX on businesses could well outweigh its 
private benefits, as it is likely too costly to eliminate all corporate fraud. Zero fraud can only be 
achieved by very stringent controls that remove most discretion and flexibility in business. The 
lack of flexibility could be far more detrimental to the vast majority of firms than a few scandals. 
Further, the passage of SOX gives rise to a broader concern that SOX could signal a shift to more 
rigid federal regulation and legislation of corporate America. Such a shift would likely reduce the 
flexibility of the current governance systems and business environment, causing extensive 
changes in the economy (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003). A PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of 
CEOs at the World Economic Forum in 2004 finds that 59% of the respondents currently view 
the risk of overregulation as one of the biggest threats to the growth of their firms (Norris et al., 
January 2004, New York Times). 
Motivated by the ongoing debate on the economic impact of SOX, this paper investigates 
the private benefits and costs of the Act by examining market reactions to the rulemaking events 
related to the Act. A maintained hypothesis is that stock prices correctly incorporate all the 
private costs and benefits of SOX. As the provisions of SOX affect every listed firm, I examine 
changes of the market index around the legislative events. I find that the cumulative abnormal 
return around the events leading to the passage of SOX is significantly negative. Moreover, most 
of the subsequent implementation activities do not significantly change investors’ expectations. 
The cumulative abnormal return around all the significant rulemaking events leading up to SOX  
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passage and subsequently related to SOX is significantly negative. The losses likely reflect the 
private costs of SOX and/or the expected costs of future government legislation.  
Further, I explore the sources of private costs/benefits of the Act by investigating its 
major provisions and their cross-sectional implications. Specifically, I examine the impact of the 
restriction of nonaudit services, the requirements on corporate responsibilities, and the provisions 
on the forfeiture of incentive pay and insider trading. If the private costs of these provisions 
outweigh their private benefits, I expect firms’ cumulative abnormal returns to be a decreasing 
function of their purchase of nonaudit services and their usage of incentive pay prior to SOX, and 
an increasing function of the stringency of their corporate governance. I also examine the impact 
of Section 404, which requires firms to test their internal controls and is considered one of the 
major cost drivers of SOX. 
I conduct cross-sectional tests for the cumulative abnormal return around the events 
leading to SOX and for each event that significantly changed investors’ expectations. The 
empirical results largely support the hypothesis that the private costs of major provisions of SOX 
exceed their potential benefits. Firms’ cumulative abnormal returns around the significant events 
are decreasing with their purchase of nonaudit services. I also find that firms with more business 
lines and firms with foreign operations or international transactions incur significantly greater 
costs to comply with Section 404. Most startlingly, firms with so-called “weak” corporate 
governance experienced more negative abnormal returns as the likelihood of passing tough rules 
increased, which is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that strengthened governance 
benefits shareholders. The result is significant based on bootstrapped statistics that address the 
potential negative association between governance and stock performance.
2 The cross-sectional 
test further suggests that SOX is likely to impose net private costs on firms, as it is unclear that 
the expected costs of future regulations vary with firms’ purchases of nonaudit services or with 
governance.  
In addition, I examine market reactions to the SEC’s announcement of deferring 
compliance with Section 404. I find that small firms that obtained a longer extension period 
experienced significantly higher abnormal returns than other firms around the announcement. 
                                                 
2 Gompers et al. (2003) find that firms with stronger governance experience higher returns than firms with weaker 
governance during the 1990s.  
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The evidence reveals that investors consider the deferment to be good news for firms and that the 
compliance costs of Section 404 are significant for small firms. 
The economic significance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been widely acknowledged and 
is considered comparable only to that of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 (see, e.g., KPMG, 
2004). Thus, it is important to understand how this Act affects businesses and how the market 
interprets the information conveyed by the passage of the Act. This paper provides evidence for 
shareholders’ collective evaluation of SOX by documenting the significant negative cumulative 
abnormal return around the rulemaking events. As SOX, the message conveyed by SOX about 
future legislation, and other contemporaneous news announcements likely changed stock prices 
and their impact cannot be separated, one cannot decisively conclude that SOX is costly. 
However, the evidence, together with the results of the cross-sectional tests of this paper, does 
suggest that SOX imposes net private costs on firms. This paper also extends the event-study 
literature by examining changes in stock prices in response to market-wide news. Existing event 
studies mostly investigate market reactions to news announcements that affect a subset of the 
listed firms. Investigating stock price reactions to market-wide news is more challenging. This 
paper adjusts expected returns in computing cumulative abnormal returns and corrects for time-
varying market volatility in the statistical tests. The impact of possible contemporaneous news 
announcements around the most significant rulemaking events is examined. I show that it is 
unlikely that other contemporary events are the key driver of the documented abnormal 
performance around the most significant rulemaking activities. 
This study focuses on the evaluation of the private benefits and costs of SOX. I do not 
explore the social welfare implication of SOX. An investigation of changes in security prices can 
only provide evidence for the private benefits and costs of regulations, which is insufficient to 
determine the social desirability of rules (Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). In addition, I acknowledge that this paper is not free of the fundamental limitations of 
event studies (Leftwich, 1981). First, the impact of other contemporaneous news announcements 
is incorporated in stock prices, though I show that other news is unlikely the key driver of the 
documented abnormal returns around the most significant SOX-related events. Second, as 
investors’ expectations are unobservable, I cannot completely rule out an alternative hypothesis 
for the observed negative cumulative abnormal return, namely, that investors had expected 
stronger rules and were disappointed by SOX. Yet, proponents who argue that SOX is beneficial  
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have to provide evidence of the benefits of SOX in order to justify this explanation. Lastly, it is 
possible that the market over-estimated the costs of SOX when it was passed and subsequently 
SOX turned out to be less costly than expected. Future research that addresses the last two issues 
would provide additional insight for the evaluation of SOX. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the event history 
of SOX and related research. Section 3 examines the private costs and benefits of the Act and 
develops hypotheses regarding the cross-sectional variation in market response to the Act. 
Empirical tests of these hypotheses and results are then presented in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Event history and related research 
 
Event history 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which combined the accounting reform bills of Sen. Sarbanes 
and Rep. Oxley, was passed in Congress on July 25, 2002. The two bills, together with a flurry of 
other legislative proposals towards corporate reforms, were triggered directly by the collapse of 
Enron in late 2001, which exposed an unprecedented accounting scandal and a seriously 
corrupted governance system. I identify the legislative events leading to the passage of SOX by a 
keyword search of “accounting” through the Wall Street Journal ( WSJ hereafter) and the 
Washington Post (WP hereafter) via Factiva, from November 2001 to July 2002. To identify 
related rulemaking events post-SOX, I search the WSJ and WP for “Sarbanes-Oxley” from 
August 2002 to December 2003 and also check press releases of the SEC and the PCAOB during 
this period. The WSJ is widely considered the most influential and timely business journal and its 
news filtering system is likely to extract the legislative activities that are most relevant to the 
business community. The WP closely follows significant movements in Congress and provides 
information supplementary to the WSJ articles. The description of the events is summarized in 
Appendix 1. 
There was no significant development in rulemaking in 2001 (Hilzenrath, December 12, 
2001, WP). The first signal of a regulatory overhaul was reported on January 16, 2002 (Day et 
al., January 16, 2002, WP): SEC Chairman Pitt would announce a reform plan to create an 
independent regulatory organization. Legislative activities progressed slowly from February to  
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May 2002. The Bush Administration unveiled their response to the Enron scandal in February 
and March, while Congress moved ahead with several proposals towards accounting reforms. 
Republican Rep. Oxley’s reform bill, which was introduced in the House on February 13, was 
considered a business-friendly reform proposal (Schroeder, February 12, 2002, WSJ). 
Meanwhile, Democratic Senators reportedly drafted bills that went beyond Oxley’s bill 
(Schroeder, March 7, 2002 and April 23, 2002, WSJ).  
Although Sen. Sarbanes’ tough reform bill passed in the Senate Banking Committee on 
June 18, it was not expected to have much chance of becoming law at that time (Hilzenrath et al., 
July 28, 2002, WP). However, the exposure of the WorldCom scandal in late June boosted 
rulemaking activities (Hamburger et al., June 27, 2002, WSJ). The rulemaking process 
accelerated after President Bush delivered a speech regarding accounting reforms on Wall Street 
on July 9 (Cummings, July 9, 2002, WSJ). The Senate started debate on Sarbanes’ bill on July 8. 
On July 9, news reports already suggested that Senate passage of the bill was very likely 
(Murray, July 9, 2002, WSJ). Sarbanes’ bill was passed 97 to 0 in the Senate on July 15 
(Hilzenrath et al., July 16, 2002, WP).  
House GOP leaders allegedly sought to dilute Sarbanes’ bill after its passage (VandeHei, 
July 17, 2002, WSJ). However, on July 18, the WSJ highlighted that House Republican leaders 
retreated from such efforts and offered minor changes to complete the legislation (Murray, July 
18, 2002, WSJ). The House and Senate formed a conference committee and started final 
negotiations to merge the bills on Friday, July 19 (Hilzenrath, July 20, 2002, WP). The 
negotiation continued over the weekend of July 20 and in a radio address on Saturday, July 20, 
President Bush urged Congress to pass a final bill before the fall recess (Melloan, July 23, 2002, 
WSJ). The final rule was agreed upon on July 24 (VandeHei et al., July 25, 2002, WP), passed in 
Congress on July 25, and signed into law on July 30 (Hitt, July 31, 2002, WSJ). The presidential 
approval on July 30 is not included in the event list and is discussed in Section 4 in detail. 
The implementation of SOX started soon after its passage. August 14, 2002 was the first 
deadline for CEOs and CFOs of the 947 largest firms to certify the truthfulness of their financial 
reports (Day et al., August 15, 2002, WP). As directed by SOX, the SEC started rulemaking 
activities as of late August 2002.
 3 The budget problem of the SEC in October and the resignation 
                                                 
3 The SEC adopted rules to require CEOs and CFOs of all public firms to certify their financial reports and to 
accelerate the filing of financial reports in August, and proposed rules regarding the disclosure of financial expert,  
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of the SEC Chairman and the Chairman of the PCAOB potentially affect the implementation of 
SOX and are included as two events.  
The rulemaking activities directed by SOX continued in 2003. The SEC proposed listing 
standards on January 8 (Schroeder, January 9, 2003, WSJ) and adopted a series of rules in mid-
January. The SEC adopted rules concerning management reports on internal controls on May 27, 
adjusting the compliance date from September 2003 in the original proposal to July 2004 for 
accelerated filers and April 2005 for nonaccelerated filers (Solomon, May 28, 2003, WSJ).
4 On 
October 7, 2003, the PCAOB proposed a standard on the audit of internal controls, as required by 
Section 404 of SOX (Bryan-Low, October 8, 2003, WSJ). The standard was adopted in March 
2004 and approved by the SEC in June, which completed the major rulemaking activities 
directed by SOX. 
 
Related research 
Several working papers examine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; however, there is 
no consensus regarding how SOX changes business practices, nor whether the changes are value 
increasing for firms. Appendix 2 provides a list of accounting papers that are related to SOX and 
that have been posted on SSRN as of December 2004. The number of working papers on SOX 
further demonstrates the significance of the Act. In this section, I focus on two working papers 
that are most closely related to this paper. Both of them reach a different conclusion than my 
study.  
Rezaee and Jain (2003) investigate S&P 500 index returns around the events leading to 
SOX, but the events they examine are largely a subset of the events listed in Appendix 1. For 
example, President Bush’s speech on July 9, 2002, which is considered a signal of a change of 
attitude in Washington (Cummings et al., July 10, 2002, WSJ), is not included in their study.
 
They find that the abnormal returns are positive around the final legislative events before the 
                                                                                                                                                              
management reports on internal controls, and new disclosure requirements of pro forma information and off-balance 
sheet transactions in October 2002.  
4 Firms satisfying the following criteria are considered “accelerated filers”: common equity public float was $75 
million or more as of the last business day of its most recently completed second fiscal quarter; the company has 
been subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act for a period of at least 12 
calendar months; the company has previously filed at least one annual report pursuant to the Exchange Act; and, the 
company is not eligible to use Forms 10-KSB and 10-QSB (see the SEC, File No. S7-08-02).  
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passage of the Act and negative around prior events.
5 They argue that the market reacts positively 
as uncertainty is resolved and thus conclude SOX is value increasing. However, the market 
response captures only the unexpected portion of news. If the final rule reveals lower costs on 
firms than expected, positive abnormal returns can be observed around its announcement, even 
though investors consider the rule to be costly. Indeed, news reports indicated that lobbyists 
successfully pushed some of their proposals through at the last minute (Hilzenrath et al., July 28, 
2002, WP; Murray and Schroeder, July 26, 2002, WSJ).
6 Moreover, reports prior to the final 
ruling revealed concerns that the rules would impose greater costs than Sarbanes’ bill (Melloan, 
July 23, 2002, WSJ). Hilzenrath et al. (July 28, 2002, WP) cite the comments of Sen. Gramm 
after the passage of SOX, “this bill could have been a lot worse,” as “virtually anything could 
have passed the Congress.” An examination of all the rulemaking events and the cumulative 
abnormal return around these events provides more unequivocal evidence than Razaee and Jain 
(2003)’s focus on the final legislative events.  
Rezaee and Jain (2003) also examine the relation between the abnormal returns of the 
S&P 500 firms around the final rulemaking events (with positive returns) and firm 
characteristics, including a firm’s S&P Transparency & Disclosure (T&D) rating, whether a 
restatement was issued during 1995 to 2002, and a firm’s purchase of nonaudit services in 2002. 
They find that firms’ abnormal returns increased with their S&P T&D rating and decreased with 
their purchase of nonaudit services in 2002. The findings are inconsistent with their claim that 
SOX provides net private benefits for firms. The reliability of their results and conclusion is 
further confounded by methodology issues (e.g., overlapping event windows, omitted events, and 
omitted correlated variables).  
Li et al. (2004) examine the market reaction to the rulemaking events around the passage 
of SOX. In addition to the events leading to SOX, they also identify several events related to the 
implementation of SOX. However, they do not provide a complete list of the events. For 
example, they do not consider the negotiation of the House-Senate conference committee starting 
July 19 to be an event. They argue that there was no news leakage prior to the issuance of the 
conference report on July 24. However, the opening statements of major lawmakers at the first 
                                                 
5 They compute the abnormal return of the market as the difference between the daily index return and the historical 
mean of index returns.  
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conference meeting on July 19 set the tone of the final bill and were made available to the public. 
Democrat Rep. LaFalce, the ranking minority leader of the House Financial Services Committee 
and a member of the conference committee, made a public statement about the progress of the 
conference on July 22. Moreover, Hilzenrath (July 20, 2002, WP), VandeHei (July 21, 2002, 
WP), Oppel (July 22, 2002, NYT), Weisman (July 23, 2002, WP), Hilzenrath et al. (July 24, 2002, 
WP) and Murray (July 24, 2002, WSJ) all discussed specific progress details of the negotiation 
and lobbying activities. The last two articles also revealed major disputes between the two parties 
by July 23, citing talks given by the lawmakers. These articles, as well as Hilzenrath et al. (July 
28, 2002, WP) who detailed the discussions of the conference committee, do not support the 
argument of Li et al. (2004).  
Li et al. (2004)’s results are further confounded by their expected return model. They 
examine market reactions to the events by estimating the deviation of the market raw returns 
around the event days from the average raw return of nonevent days in 2002. They find positive 
“abnormal” returns around the final rulemaking events and conclude that investors viewed SOX 
as beneficial. However, it is unclear that the average raw return of nonevent days is an 
appropriate benchmark to evaluate expected returns around the event days. The omission of 
events makes the model even more problematic. Their cross-sectional test provides little support 
for their hypothesis that SOX is beneficial.
7 
Both Razaee and Jain (2003) and Li et al. (2004) conclude that SOX is beneficial. 
However, this study finds significantly conflicting evidence after taking into account the above-
mentioned problems. First, I find no evidence supporting the conjecture that SOX is beneficial. 
Second, I systematically examine specific provisions of SOX that are likely to introduce changes 
and I find no evidence that the investigated provisions are beneficial. The evidence suggests that 
SOX and/or the message conveyed by the passage of SOX are bad news to the market. Several 
other studies, such as Cohen et al. (2004a), look into the impact of SOX by examining changes in 
the behavior of firms around the passage of the Act. Their time-series tests usually investigate 
one aspect of the impact of SOX and require a long time series of data to obtain powerful results. 
                                                                                                                                                              
6 Hilzenrath et al. (2002) point out that the three key targets of lobbyists are: requiring the chairman of the board to 
certify their firms’ financial statements, prosecuting CEOs for unintentional misstatement, and extending the statute 
of limitations for securities lawsuits. Hilzenrath et al. (2002) suggest that lobbyists won the first two battles. 
7 Engel et al. (2004) examine firms’ going private decisions. They also conduct an event study of SOX in the first 
part of the paper. They do not test the value implication of SOX, but focus instead on its cross-sectional implications.  
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Moreover, these tests are potentially confounded by contemporaneous changes in economic 
conditions. The event-study setting of this paper provides a complimentary and more complete 
test of the impact of SOX. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
 
Overall market reaction to SOX 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), prohibits auditors from performing certain nonaudit services for their audit clients, 
and imposes greater criminal penalties for corporate fraud. Further, Section 404 of the Act 
requires that management assess internal controls and that auditors report on their clients’ 
internal controls. The specifics of SOX are discussed in greater detail in the next subsection. 
The impact of SOX has been extensively debated. Lawmakers expect SOX to enhance 
corporate controls of public firms and prevent accounting misrepresentations. If the exposed 
accounting scandals that led to the rulemaking activities suggest a pervasive market failure, the 
regulations could increase firm value and improve efficiency. As Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
point out, regulations could improve social welfare in a Pareto sense, if the government’s 
contracting costs are lower than the private contracting costs. For example, legislation that 
reduces the transaction costs of takeovers could improve the efficiency of the market for 
corporate controls and increase firm value. 
However, it is unclear that the government’s remedies are always less costly than the 
private contracting process, especially in the case of SOX. The Act rushed through Congress in a 
very short period of time. Contemporary news reports unveiled substantial politics between 
Republicans and Democrats in the rulemaking process (e.g., Melloan, July 23, 2002, WSJ; 
Hilzenrath et al., July 28, 2002, WP). Democrats reportedly planned to charge pro-business 
Republicans with being soft on corporate scandals in the congressional election of November 
2002. Facing such pressure, Republicans responded by showing their determination to punish 
corporate wrongdoings. The politicians’ eagerness to win the election, rather than an intention to 
                                                                                                                                                              
For a sample of firms that went private after SOX and their matching firms, Engel et al. (2004) find that the 
cumulative abnormal returns are an increasing function of firm size and stock liquidity.  
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increase firm value, was alleged to motivate them to draft tough legislation and pass it swiftly 
(Ramano, 2004).  
The business community and certain academics criticize SOX more specifically. 
Executives complain about the substantial out-of-pocket compliance costs and indirect 
opportunity costs imposed by SOX. They argue that complying with the rules diverts their 
attention from doing business and brings little benefit (Solomon et al., 2004). Moreover, Ribstein 
(2002) suggests that SOX could discourage CEOs from value-increasing risky investment, as it 
significantly increases the litigation risks of management. The change in management’s risk-
taking behavior will likely reduce the growth of their firms and even deter economic growth 
(Wallison, 2003). Further, there are concerns that SOX could signal a change in attitude in 
Washington. Ramano (2004) argues that SOX is not just a considerable change in law but also a 
departure in the mode of regulation. The change in the behavior of lawmakers, especially the pro-
business Republicans, towards tighter government controls is likely to give rise to more and 
tighter federal and state regulations in the future. Thus, the change is expected to have long-
lasting and far-reaching influence on business practices (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003).  
If investors consider the Act beneficial (costly) and/or the information conveyed by the 
passage of the Act good news (bad news) for business, the cumulative market reaction to the 
rulemaking events will be positive (negative). 
 
H1a: The cumulative abnormal return around the rulemaking events related to 
SOX is positive. 
 
H1b: The cumulative abnormal return around the rulemaking events related to 
SOX is negative. 
 
The market response to individual events was determined by the value implication of the 
Act and how the news changed investors’ expectations of the probability of passing tough rules.
8 
If the proposed regulation imposed net private costs on firms, events that increased (reduced) the 
probability of passing tough rules would be associated with significant negative (positive) 
abnormal returns.  
                                                 
8 See Leftwich (1981) for a model of market response to rulemaking events.  
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Specific provisions of SOX and their cross-sectional implications 
SOX consists of 11 parts. Title I, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Title V, 
Analyst conflicts of interest, Title VI, Commission resources and authority, Title VII, Studies and 
reports, and Title X, Corporate tax returns, are unlikely to have significant cross-sectional 
implications on individual firms. The remaining provisions mainly cover five areas, namely, 
auditor independence, insider trading, disclosure, internal controls, and corporate responsibilities. 
 
Provisions on nonaudit services 
SOX prohibits accounting firms from providing eight categories of nonaudit services 
contemporaneously with audit services, thereby leaving tax services as the primary nonaudit 
service available to audit clients (Section 201).
9  
The restriction of nonaudit services evidently reflects lawmakers’ concern that the 
provision of nonaudit services compromises auditor independence by increasing the economic 
bond between the auditor and the client. This concern also motivated the SEC to require the 
disclosure of all audit and nonaudit fees paid to the auditor since February 2001. However, 
auditors adamantly oppose this position of lawmakers and argue that performing nonaudit 
services helps them gain competencies and capabilities that are essential to the audit process 
(Schroeder et al., June 19, 2002, WSJ).  
Empirical evidence on the relation between nonaudit services and audit quality is mixed. 
Frankel et al. (2002) document that nonaudit fees are positively associated with their measures of 
earnings management. They also find a negative association between nonaudit fees and the 
market reaction on the date the fees are disclosed. In contrast, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) find no 
evidence to support the claim that nonaudit services impair auditor independence. They point out 
that the results of Frankel et al. (2002) are sensitive to research design choices.  
The above countervailing arguments generate opposite predictions for the impact of the 
restriction of nonaudit services. Regulators expect the restriction to reduce the economic bond 
between the auditor and the client, thereby improving auditor independence and the credibility of 
financial statements. It predicts that the provision is beneficial for firms. I call this argument the 
                                                 
9 The prohibited nonaudit services include: bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records of 
financial statements of the audit client; financial information system design and implementation; appraisal or 
valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; actuarial services; internal audit outsourcing  
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benefit hypothesis. In particular, firms that purchased more nonaudit services from their auditor 
are expected to benefit more from the rule change. These firms were likely to have less credible 
accounting prior to SOX if their auditor compromised audit quality by providing consulting 
services.  
On the other hand, the logic of the accounting profession implies that the restriction 
destroys value by eliminating the cost-efficiency of hiring the auditor as a consultant. Ribstein 
(2002) suggests that the restriction could block “knowledge spillovers” that give auditors access 
to valuable information. Auditors will incur greater costs in the audit process to gain the 
institutional knowledge that they could have obtained while performing consulting services for 
their client. New business consultants will also make greater initial investments than the auditor 
used to. The incremental costs will be borne by the client. I call this argument the cost 
hypothesis. It predicts firms that purchased more nonaudit services will lose more as a result of 
the rule change.  
 
H2a: Benefit – Ceteris paribus, firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (abnormal 
returns around the events that increase the likelihood of passing tough rules) are 
increasing with their purchase of nonaudit services from the auditor. 
 
H2b: Cost – Ceteris paribus, firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (abnormal 
returns around the events that increase the likelihood of passing tough rules) are 
decreasing with their purchase of nonaudit services from the auditor. 
 
It should be noted that the purchase of nonaudit services is likely correlated with other 
firm characteristics such as financial and business risks (Frankel et al., 2002). I discuss 
alternative explanations for the relation between market reactions to SOX and firms’ purchase of 




                                                                                                                                                              
services; management functions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment advisor, or investment banking 
services; legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit.  
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Provisions on incentive pay and insider trading 
If there is an accounting restatement as a result of misconduct, SOX requires CEOs and 
CFOs to reimburse any incentive-based compensation or profits from the sale of stock received 
in the 12 months after the misreporting (Section 304). Additionally, executives are prohibited 
from selling company stock during the pension blackout periods and are required to report sales 
or purchases of company stock within two days rather than the previous ten days of the 
transaction (Section 306).
10 
There has been a general concern that compensation contracts for executives are 
suboptimal. The business press criticizes stock option grants and other incentive-based 
compensation for providing managers with excessive incentives to manipulate accounting 
numbers and eventually stock prices in order to maximize their personal wealth (e.g., Kristof et 
al., July 12, 2002, LA Times). The new rule on the forfeiture of incentive pay and the restrictions 
on insider trading aim to reduce such incentives and deter misreporting.
11 Particularly, this 
argument suggests that firms in which CEOs are compensated more with incentive-based pay 
benefit more from the provision.  
However, the potential benefits of reducing contract-motivated earnings management 
could be lower than the costs of the changes. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) argue that these 
provisions increase the risk to CEOs or CFOs of selling a large amount of stock or options while 
they are still in office, as “misconduct” is not clearly defined. They also predict that the 
provisions will reduce the liquidity of executive shares. Both changes are likely to motivate firms 
to alter their compensation structure, substituting incentive-based compensation with an increase 
in cash salary. Ribstein (2002) argues that such a change can cause CEOs to act more 
conservatively than shareholders would prefer. Consistent with this view, Cohen et al. (2004b) 
document a significant decline in both the ratio of incentive compensation to salary and the 
outlays in R&D and capital expenditures after SOX. These predictions indicate that the potential 
private costs imposed by the provisions are likely considerable. Following this line, the more 
                                                 
10 Pension blackout period is defined in Section 306 (a) (4) of the Act. It refers to any period during which the 
majority of plan beneficiaries are prohibited from trading on any equity of the firm held in the plans. 
11 The provision on the forfeiture of incentive pay is generally considered by the legal literature an innovation of 
SOX (e.g., Romano, 2004; Cunningham, 2002; Ribstein, 2002). There are basically two arguments regarding how 
this provision increases executive liabilities. First, managers could be held liable for poor judgment and negligence 
(Cunningham, 2002; Ribstein, 2002). This suggests that executives cannot use poor judgment as an excuse to defend 
themselves in lawsuits. Second, CEOs could be held liable for the misconduct of others in the firm (Ribstein, 2002). 
However, it is still unclear how “misconduct” in this provision will be interpreted by the court.   
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firms compensate their CEOs with incentive pay, the greater costs they will incur as a result of 
the change. 
 
H3a: Benefit – Ceteris paribus, firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (abnormal 
returns around the events that increase the likelihood of passing tough rules) are 
increasing with their use of incentive-based compensation.
  
 
H3b: Cost – Ceteris paribus, firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (abnormal 
returns around the events that increase the likelihood of passing tough rules) are 
decreasing with their use of incentive-based compensation. 
 
Provisions on corporate responsibilities and criminal penalties 
SOX requires CEOs and CFOs to certify annual and quarterly reports to the SEC (Section 
302) and raises the criminal penalties for corporate fraud and white-collar crimes.  The statute of 
limitations for security lawsuits is extended from three years to five years after the misconduct 
(Section 804). Moreover, SOX directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to promulgate 
amendments to tighten sentencing guidelines for fraud and white-collar crimes (Sections 805, 
905, and 1104). Section 305 lowers the standard to bar a person from serving as an officer or 
director.
12 Although the latter changes are not as specific as the increases of penalties, they 
indicate a change in attitude towards corporate crimes, and can be expected to influence 
subsequent legislation and enforcement. 
The certification requirement and increased criminal penalties intend to improve the 
accountability of executives and directors to shareholders. These changes are expected to reduce 
executives’ incentive to commit fraud, to enhance the monitoring role of directors, and to better 
protect shareholder rights. In particular, this benefit hypothesis suggests that firms with weak 
governance and shareholder protection will benefit more from the regulation, as executives in 
                                                 
12 The Security Acts of 1933 and 1934 provide that the court can issue an order prohibiting a person from acting as 
an officer or director of a public company if the person has committed a securities violation and his or her conduct 
demonstrates "substantial unfitness" to serve as an officer or director. However, judicial interpretations of the phrase 
"substantial unfitness" have created a very high standard for obtaining a bar. The change is intended to reduce the 
burden of establishing unfitness to serve as an officer and director (see Summary of Corporate Responsibility Act of 
2002, The House Financial Committee).  
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these firms are more likely to be entrenched and engage in opportunistic behavior, according to 
the argument underlying the benefit hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, the mandatory change of governance and shareholder rights could impose 
substantial private costs on businesses. Firms have been complaining about the difficulty of 
finding qualified directors, the rising compensation of directors, and the rising costs of directors’ 
and officers’ insurance policies (Francis, July 31, 2003, WSJ). Yet, the indirect costs of tight 
governance are likely to be much greater. A flexible governance system could be optimal for 
certain firms. For example, for firms that face dynamic market conditions, the intervention of 
outside directors and shareholders could delay the decision-making process, resulting in a loss of 
investment opportunities. Thus, it is likely efficient to give the management of these firms greater 
discretion and flexibility in decision making. Forcing these firms to change their flexible 
governance systems will likely give rise to additional costs in the form of monitoring expenses 
and forgone investment opportunities. Further, SOX is predicted to encourage aggressive 
shareholder litigation. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) argue that the pressure from the litigation 
risk will motivate executives and directors to allocate more resources to protect themselves 
against potential lawsuits. This hypothesis suggests that the mandatory changes will result in 
greater losses in firms with so-called weak governance systems prior to SOX.  
 
H4a: Benefit – Ceteris paribus, firms with stronger corporate governance 
experience lower cumulative abnormal returns (abnormal returns around the 
events that increase the likelihood of passing tough rules). 
 
H4b: Cost – Ceteris paribus, firms with stronger corporate governance 
experience higher cumulative abnormal returns (abnormal returns around the 
events that increase the likelihood of passing tough rules).  
 
Provisions on internal controls 
SOX directs the SEC to set rules that require management to document and assess the 
effectiveness of internal controls. It also directs the PCAOB to prescribe rules requiring the 
auditor to attest to and report on management’s assessment (Section 404).  
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Section 404 is considered bringing one of the most significant changes in financial 
reporting and the key direct cost driver of SOX. Again, the provision could benefit firms by 
tightening internal controls and reducing opportunistic behavior, but it is also associated with 
substantial implementation costs. If the provision brings net benefits (costs), firms with weak 
internal controls are expected to benefit (lose) more than firms with tight controls in place. 
Information regarding firms’ internal controls was rarely disclosed prior to SOX. It is 
likely that investors could not distinguish a firm with strong controls from one with weak 
controls. As a result, whether Section 404 is beneficial or costly on the net cannot be tested as 
with the other provisions. However, the market will still impound expected Section 404 costs into 
stock prices based on public information. The PCAOB auditing rules regarding Section 404 
require auditors to perform a walk-through of major classes of transactions while evaluating 
management’s assessment of controls. This suggests that firms with more business lines will 
incur greater compliance costs. Also, firms with foreign operations or transacting with foreign 
parties will likely incur greater costs, as their transactions are more complicated, and the 
documentation and evaluation of internal controls are more costly. If the costs of complying with 
Section 404 are significant and if investors could reasonably expect the costs of the control test to 
increase with the complexity of a firm’s business, firms with more business lines or foreign 
operations would experience lower returns around the events that increased the likelihood of 
passage of SOX. 
 
H5: Ceteris paribus, firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (abnormal returns 
around the events that increase the likelihood of passing tough rules) are 
decreasing with the complexity of firms’ business.  
 
The SEC adopted rules regarding management’s report on internal controls on May 27, 
2003. In the original proposal, firms were required to comply with Section 404 from the fiscal 
year ending on or after September 15, 2003; in the final rule, accelerated filers are required to 
comply from the fiscal year ending on or after June 15, 2004 and nonaccelerated filers are 
required to comply from the fiscal year ending on or after April 15, 2005.
13 Further, as the 
                                                 
13 The compliance date was further extended in February 2004 and March 2005. The SEC extended the compliance 
date to fiscal year ending on or after November 15, 2004 for accelerated filers, and to fiscal year ending on or after  
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compliance date was not extended by one full year or two full years, firms with different fiscal 
year ends obtain different extension periods. Early adopters of Section 404 will develop 
techniques and procedures in their control tests that will be useful for late adopters. Moreover, 
late adopters avoid competing with early adopters for auditing resources to comply with Section 
404. Thus, late adopters would incur lower compliance costs and experience higher abnormal 
returns around this announcement, if the cost savings from postponing Section 404 are 
significant. On the other hand, if firms’ internal control systems are so weak on average that it is 
a top priority for them to comply with Section 404, the postponement of the compliance date 
constitutes bad news to investors. If this is the case, late adopters would experience lower 
abnormal returns than early adopters. 
 
H6a: Ceteris paribus, firms that obtained a longer extension period experienced 
lower abnormal returns than firms that were required to comply with Section 404 
earlier around the announcement of postponing the compliance dates. 
 
H6b: Ceteris paribus, firms that obtained a longer extension period experienced 
higher abnormal returns than firms that were required to comply with Section 404 
earlier around the announcement of postponing the compliance dates. 
 
Provisions on disclosure and other regulatory changes 
SOX directs the SEC to issue final rules requiring full disclosure of material off-balance-
sheet transactions (Section 401). It also directs the SEC to issue rules requiring that pro forma 
financial information not contain misleading statements and be reconciled with GAAP numbers 
(Section 401). Section 409 further requires firms to provide real-time disclosure of material 
changes in operations or financial conditions.  
The benefits and costs of mandatory disclosure are not obvious. Disclosure could increase 
firm value by mitigating the information asymmetry problem, but it could also reduce value by 
releasing proprietary information of the firm (Lo, 2003). As firms ultimately bear the cost of 
withholding information, they have incentives to provide information voluntarily (Bushee and 
                                                                                                                                                              
July 15, 2005 for nonaccelerated filers and foreign private issuers on February 24, 2004. On March 2, 2005, the 
compliance date for nonaccelerated filers and foreign private issuers was extended for one more year.  
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Leuz, 2004). The value implication of mandatory additional disclosure is thus determined by 
whether the pre-SOX disclosure practices maximize firm value.  
The impact of the disclosure requirements is not tested in this paper. Some of the 
requirements are unlikely to have new content (e.g., reconciliation of pro forma and GAAP 
accounting numbers, see Bhattacharya et al., 2004; timely disclosure); others are not testable in 
the event-study setting (e.g., disclosure of off-balance-sheet transactions).
14 In sensitivity 
analyses, I examine whether the market response to SOX varies with firms’ disclosure ratings. 
In addition to the above-mentioned major provisions, SOX also changes audit practices 
by requiring a rotation of audit partners every five years (Section 203). The rotation of audit 
partners is likely a compromise between advocates and opponents of accounting firm rotation. 
The rule applies to all firms and it is unclear whether the requirement has significant benefits or 
costs. Title III of SOX also specifies certain requirements about the composition of audit 
committees. Prior to SOX, NYSE and NASDAQ had already required listed firms to establish 
independent audit committees with certain exceptions (Klein, 2003). While SOX strengthens the 
independence requirement, the requirement is not innovative.
15  
In summary, the economic impact of SOX on firms is determined by the potential private 
benefits and private costs associated with its specific provisions. If government regulations are 
less costly than the private contracting process, the major provisions of SOX are likely to correct 
the market failures and increase firm value. However, if government regulations are more costly 
than the private contracting process, the requirements of SOX are likely to impose significant 
costs on firms and reduce firm value. The value implication of SOX will be reflected in the 





                                                 
14 Prior to SOX, FAS 140 required disclosure of information about securitized financial assets, a subset of off-
balance-sheet arrangements, in footnotes. If this is the only type of off-balance-sheet transactions of a firm, the new 
disclosure requirement does not have a material impact. For other types of off-balance-sheet transactions, the 
information is unavailable before it is disclosed. As a result, it is unlikely that the market can distinguish the impact 
of the requirement on different firms around the passage of SOX.  
15 SOX requires members of the audit committee to accept no consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fees from 
the firm other than in the capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any other board  
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4. Empirical tests and results 
 
This section discusses the empirical tests of the private costs and benefits of SOX. First, 
the cumulative abnormal returns around the legislative events are examined to test H1. 
Methodological issues related to expected returns, market volatility, and confounding events are 
discussed in detail. Second, cross-sectional regressions are estimated to test H2 to H6. Lastly, I 
discuss alternative explanations and sensitivity analyses. 
 
 Overall market reaction to the legislative events leading to SOX 
 
 Market expected return and volatility 
As the most influential legislation in decades, SOX has a significant economic impact on 
every listed firm. Consequently, I examine the changes of the market index around the related 
legislative events. To investigate the impact of the rulemaking news on the market index, I need 
to specify an expected return model for the market index and examine the abnormal returns of the 
market.  
It has been documented in finance that expected market returns can be predicted by 
financial variables. Fama (1990) and Schwert (1990) model monthly, quarterly, and annual 
expected returns as a function of dividend yields on stocks, default spreads on corporate bonds, 
and term spreads on bonds. Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) extend the expectation model to 
daily returns and further control for past stock returns and the logarithm of the value of the 
market portfolio. Following this literature, I employ the following model for expected returns, 
Et-1 (VWRETt) = a0 + a1 TB3Mt-1 + a2 DEFt-1 + a3 TPREt-1 + a4 DIVPRIt-5+ a5 LMVt-5+ a6 






i iD a           
 (1) 
VWRETt refers to the value-weighted CRSP daily returns. TB3Mt-1 is the three-month 
Treasury bill rate. DEFt-1 is the default premium, which is computed as the difference in the 
yields to maturity between Moody’s Baa and Aaa seasoned corporate bond indices. TPREt-1 is the 
Treasury term structure premium, which is computed as the difference in the yields to maturity of 
                                                                                                                                                              
committees. In contrast, NYSE prohibits members of the audit committee to have a business relationship that  
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the ten-year Treasury bond and the three-month Treasury bill. The above three variables are 
lagged one trading day and the data is obtained from the Federal Reserve’s H.15 release of 
interest rate data (daily). The variable DIVPRIt-5 is the dividend price ratio of the value-weighted 
market portfolio and LMVt-5 is the logarithm of the value of the market portfolio. These two 
variables are lagged five trading days to avoid spurious correlation with returns and the data is 
obtained from CRSP daily files (Flannery et al., 2002). JAN equals one if day t is in January and 
DEC equals one if day t is between December 28 and 31. These two variables are included to 
capture the “January effect”. The Dis are dummy variables for four of the five weekdays 
(Wednesday is the excluded day). These dummy variables are used to control for weekly patterns 
in stock returns.
16 As the daily data of the yield of Moody’s Baa corporate bond indices became 
available on Federal Reserve’s website after 1986, model (1) is estimated using daily data from 
1986 to 2001.  
The estimation results are reported in Table 1 Panel A. The coefficient estimates are 
roughly consistent with the estimation results of Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002).
17 The 
explanatory power of the regression is quite low. However, it is important to control for the 
expected return in the test of cumulative market reactions. The expected market return over a 
month or an even longer period is certainly non-zero. The daily expected returns of the test 
period are computed using the estimated parameters. The daily abnormal returns (AR) are then 
calculated as the difference between the value-weighted returns (VWRET) and the estimated 
expected returns.  
Traditional event studies use the standard deviation of prediction errors in the estimation 
period to test the statistical significance of abnormal returns in the event period (Brown and 
Warner, 1985). The maintained hypothesis is that volatility does not change over time. However, 
news announcements are likely to affect stock returns as well as market volatility. The implied 
                                                                                                                                                              
compromises independence; NASDAQ further specifies monetary cutoffs for such relationships (Klein, 2003). 
16 This model does not directly control for the announcement of macroeconomic factors such as CPI, PPI, industrial 
production, and M1. However, CPI, PPI, and industrial production data are announced on a fixed day of each month 
(the second Friday for CPI, the second Thursday for PPI, and the middle of each month for industrial production) 
and M1 is announced every Thursday. The weekday dummies could control for part of their impact on market 
returns. Moreover, as the events do not concentrate on a particular weekday, these factors are unlikely to 
systematically affect the results. The impact of economic news is further discussed later in this section. 
17 I also estimate the parameters of model (1) using daily data in 2001. The results of the subsequent tests are 
qualitatively the same. The inferences also remain intact if I include VWRETt-1 in the expectation model. The 
inclusion of VWRETt-1 is likely to bias the estimation of cumulative abnormal returns around the events. However, 
the model that excludes VWRETt-1 fails to capture the autocorrelation of stock returns, which is likely important in 
estimating equal-weighted expected returns.  
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volatility index for the S&P 500 portfolio (VIX) estimated by the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) indicates that the average VIX increased from 22% per year in January 2002 
to 34% per year in July 2002. Failure to account for time-varying market volatility is likely to 
affect the reliability of the statistical tests of market returns. As a result, I use three proxies for 
volatility: (1) the standard deviation of prediction errors in the estimation period, (2) the standard 
deviation of prediction errors in the 30 days prior to day t, and (3) the closing VIX of day t-1.
18 
The historical realized volatility of the raw and abnormal value-weighted index returns are very 
close and are close to that of S&P 500 index returns. In the 24 years from 1980 to 2003, the 
realized volatility of the raw and abnormal value-weighted returns estimated using daily data in 
each year are on average 92% of the realized volatility of S&P 500 index returns and are lower 
than the latter in 22 years. This suggests that statistics based the VIX are slightly understated. 
 
 Cumulative abnormal returns over the event period 
Table 1 Panel B reports the cumulative raw market returns and abnormal returns around 
the legislative events leading to the passage of SOX. The statistical test of the raw returns is 
based on the standard deviation of daily raw market returns from 1986 to 2001, the standard 
deviation of daily raw returns in the 30 days prior to day t, and the closing VIX of day t-1. 
Table 1 Panel B shows that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around all the 
legislative events leading to the passage of SOX is significantly negative (-19.89%). This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that investors considered the new rule and/or the information it 
conveyed to be bad news, assuming, for now, that the negative return is not driven by other 
contemporaneous news announcements. Few events prior to July 2002 are associated with 
significant revisions of expectations. This is consistent with what news reports revealed (e.g., 
Cummings et al, July 10, 2002, WSJ): the probability of passing laws was generally considered 
remote before July. I also test the cumulative return around all the events that are associated with 
significant market reactions. The results are consistent with the test of cumulative abnormal 
returns around all the events. 
The market reactions to individual events are consistent with the hypothesis that events 
increasing (reducing) the probability of passing tough rules are associated with negative 
(positive) returns. For example, Oxley’s bill was considered proposing mild changes in a 
                                                 
18 VIX is annualized. I scale it back to daily volatility in the statistical test by dividing it by  365  (Schwert, 2002).  
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business-friendly manner (Schroeder et al., April 17, 2002, WSJ). It would empower the SEC to 
supervise the new oversight authority and to set the limits to nonaudit services (Congress, 
Summary of H.R.3763 as of April 24, 2002). In contrast, Sarbanes’ bill endows the new 
oversight body greater power in standard setting, requires all CEOs and CFOs to certify financial 
reports, explicitly bans certain types of consulting services by the auditor, requires internal 
control assessment, extends the statute of limitation of security lawsuits, and promotes penalties 
for reckless violation of security laws (Congress, Summary of S.2673 as of July 15, 2002). The 
House Financial Services Committee scheduled to vote on Oxley’s bill on April 11, but the vote 
was later postponed because of Democrats’ attempts to toughen the bill. As the expected costs of 
the bill increased, the abnormal market return on that day was -2.16%. The negative return 
reversed when the bill finally passed on April 16 (2.15%) without significant changes.  
The most momentous rulemaking activities occurred in July 2002 and were associated 
with the most significant market reactions. President Bush’s speech on July 9 (event 14) was 
considered signaling a change of attitude in Washington and a change in the balance of power 
between the federal government and American corporations (Cummings et al., July 10, 2002, 
WSJ). The November congressional election, in which Democrats hoped to gain ground by 
charging that the Bush team had been soft on corporate misbehavior, is cited as the motivation 
for the change (Murray et al., July 11, 2002, WSJ). The evolvement of laws that were considered 
inconceivable a few weeks before the speech became imminent after President Bush expressed 
his agreement with Senate Democrats on the goals of reforms (Cummings et al., July 10, 2002, 
WSJ). The market realized a significant negative abnormal return (-2.28%) on the day of the 
speech. The Senate started debate on Sarbanes’ bill on July 8. Several amendments to add more 
teeth to the bill were passed on July 10. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Chairman’s amendment to impose tougher penalties for corporate wrongdoings was passed 97 to 
0 (Murray et al., July 11, 2002, WSJ). Consistent with the hypothesis that these tough 
amendments were considered costly and/or signaling bad news to the market, the abnormal return 
of July 10 was -3.11%.  
Negative market returns were also observed when the House Republican leaders 
reportedly gave up efforts to water down the Senate’s tough bill around July 18 (event 16). News 
reports explained the change as Republicans’ efforts to prevent Democrats from using the issue 
in the fall elections (Murray, July 18, 2002, WSJ). The passage of a tough reform bill became  
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increasingly likely, especially after Bush’s radio address urging Congress to speed up the 
legislation and finish it within one week. There were concerns that the final bill would impose 
even greater costs than Sarbanes’ proposal. Melloan (July 23, 2002, WSJ) commented that the 
unanimous passage of several proposals in the Senate were scary, as they signaled that most of 
the members did not care much about the contents of the bill; rather, they only wanted to show in 
the November election that they voted the “right” way. He argues that the “win-at-any-cost” 
attitudes of politicians could be at least partly responsible for the volatility in the stock market. 
The cumulative abnormal returns from July 18 to July 23 amounted to -12.27%. 
Given these concerns prior to the final ruling, the positive return on July 24 (event 17) is 
not surprising. The abnormal return of July 24 was 5.07%, consistent with the explanation that 
the final announcement eliminated prior concerns for tougher rules. By July 23, the House and 
Senate negotiators still could not agree on several issues including the authority of the PCAOB, 
whether to prosecute executives that misstate financial reports without a criminal intent, and the 
extension of the statute of limitations for securities lawsuits (Murray, July 24, 2002, WSJ). The 
final rule increased the SEC’s control over the PCAOB and dropped the proposal to punish 
unintentional misstatement, but kept the extension of the statute of litigation limitations proposed 
by the Senate (Murray et al., July 26, 2002, WSJ). Thus, business lobbyists won part of the game 
(Hilzenrath et al., July 28, 2002, WP).  
I also conduct the above tests using equal-weighted index returns. The raw cumulative 
equal-weighted return around the events leading to SOX is -11.38%, higher than that of the 
value-weighted return (-16.00%). However, after I adjust for expected returns based on model 
(1), which is re-estimated using equal-weighted returns, the cumulative abnormal return is -
22.85%, 2.96% lower than the value-weighted cumulative abnormal return (-19.89%). Small 
firms are expected to incur disproportionately greater compliance costs than large firms (e.g., 
Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Friedman, 2003, LA Times). Yet, large firms could face greater 
indirect costs. Shu (2000) finds that, ceteris paribus, large firms are more likely to get sued than 
small firms. As a result, the increased litigation risks could impose disproportionately greater 
costs on large firms. Moreover, if part of the negative return reflects expected costs related to 





Magnitude of losses in the rulemaking period 
The total market value of NYSE, AMEX and NADAQ as of July 31, 2002 was $11.3 
trillion and the total market value loss around the three significant events (events 14, 16 and 17) 
in July 2002 amounted to about $1.4 trillion. The losses are huge and it is unlikely that all the 
losses can be directly attributed to SOX. 
I estimate the direct costs of SOX based on a recent study by A.R.C. Morgan. This study 
examines the actual Section 404 cost disclosure of approximately 280 firms. The average initial 
compliance costs range from $1.56 million for firms with annual sales less than $250 million to 
$10 million for firms with annual sales between $7 billion and $10 billion. The costs do not 
include the increase in audit fees or the internal costs. A.R.C. Morgan estimates that these 
excluded costs would be almost as large as the disclosed numbers, while FEI’s survey of Section 
404 compliance costs suggests that the sum of internal costs and the increase in audit fees would 
be greater than the external costs. Suppose the excluded costs in A.R.C. Morgan’s study are as 
large as the average disclosed costs, and the compliance costs are capitalized in perpetuity at a 
rate of 10%, the total direct compliance costs would be around $260 billion.
19 This is likely a 
small part of the total costs of SOX; the indirect opportunity costs are conceivably much higher. 
If one assumes that the opportunity costs are three times as large as the direct costs of SOX, the 
costs of SOX would amount to $1 trillion.  
However, although this estimate is based on very pessimistic assumptions such as the 
initial compliance costs would persist, the amount is still significantly smaller than the 
                                                 
19 The total annual compliance costs of Section 404 are estimated as follows. The average costs per firm (external 
costs excluding the increase in audit fees) in each revenue category are obtained from the study of A.R.C. Morgan. 
A.R.C. Morgan does not provide the average costs for firms with annual revenue between $2 and $7 billion or for 
nonaccelerated filers. The costs of each firm in these two groups are estimated as 0.12% or 0.62% multiplying 
annual revenue. All the dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 Annual  Revenue 
# of 
firms  Costs per firm  Total costs 
Percentage of 
Revenue 
Accelerated below  $250 1,656  $1.56  $2,583.36 Greater  than  0.62% 
$250-500  588  1.71  1,005.48  0.34% - 0.68%  Mkt Cap >= 
$75  $500-750  339  1.78  603.42  0.24% - 0.36% 
  $750-1,000  215  2.03  436.45  0.20% - 0.27% 
  $1-2 billion  471  2.40  1,130.40  0.12% - 0.24% 
 $2-7  billion  518  N/A  2,246.70  0.12% 
  $7-10 billion (and above)  384  10  3,840.00  0.10% - 0.14% 
   4,171   $11,845.81   
Nonaccelerated   2,194  N/A 1,134.44 0.62% 
Total   6,365*    $12,980.25   
*The market index returns of July 2002 were based on return data of approximately 7,200 firms. Among them, 6,365 
firms have revenue data of 2001 from Compustat.   
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documented loss of $1.4 trillion in the rulemaking period. Based on the above estimate, at least 
$400 million of the documented loss is not directly related to SOX. The expected costs of future 
anti-business regulations could be reflected in the loss. As Ramano (2004) and Holmstrom and 
Kaplan (2003) suggest, SOX could signal a shift to a less business-favorable environment. The 
expected costs of future anti-business legislation are thus reflected in the loss estimated above. 
Also, the documented price decline may incorporate the impact of other contemporaneous news 
announcements, which is discussed in the next subsection. As the expected costs of future 
regulations and the impact of other contemporaneous news cannot be separated from the 
documented abnormal return in the rulemaking period, one cannot decisively conclude that SOX 
is costly. To provide further evidence regarding the value implication of SOX, I examine the 
sources of benefits and costs by investigating the cross-sectional implication of specific 
provisions of SOX in Section 4.3.  
To summarize, the evidence presented in Table 1 Panel B consistently supports the 
hypothesis that shareholders consider SOX costly and/or the information conveyed by the 
passage of SOX bad news. Events 2, 14, 16, and 17 were associated with significant changes in 
investors’ expectations of the likelihood of passing tough rules. The market responded negatively 
to events that signaled increases in the likelihood of passing tough rules and positively to events 
revealing that no further costs would be imposed. However, not all the documented negative 
return can be directly attributed to SOX. The subsequent cross-sectional tests provide 
complementary evidence regarding the value implication of SOX. 
 
Confounding events and intraday returns 
One of the fundamental limitations of event studies is that the measured abnormal 
performance could also capture other information released at the same calendar date (Leftwich, 
1981). This problem particularly stands out in this paper’s setting. The market abnormal returns 
likely incorporate investors’ reactions to news releases about other legislative activities, 
accounting scandals, and economic statistics. 
To evaluate how much the abnormal returns documented in Table 1 are affected by 
confounding events, I search for the above-mentioned three categories of market-wide news via 
ProQuest from July 8 to July 31, 2002. First, I search the WSJ and WP for news reports with their 
subjects including “federal legislation” or “federal regulation.” The search reveals rulemaking  
 
27
activities related to four major issues other than the accounting legislation in July 2002: the Trade 
Act of 2002, the Homeland Security bill, a proposal targeting tax shelters (H.R. 5095), and 
proposals related to prescription drugs and Medicare. The activities related to prescription drugs 
likely have a direct impact on an industry rather than the whole economy. Further, it is unclear 
whether the bill to allow the re-importation of prescription drugs, which was passed in the Senate 
on July 17, could be implemented, given the required certification of the safety of re-importation 
(Lueck, July 18, 2002, WSJ). Thus, I focus on congressional activities related to the other three 
issues. Reported legislative activities are presented in Table 2 Panel A column (1). The Trade Act 
of 2002 grants the President more authority in free trade negotiations. This act is expected to 
have broad benefits for the economy as a whole, though it can be harmful for certain industries or 
workers (Philips, July 19, 2002, WSJ). News reports describe its passage in the House on July 27 
as a triumph for businesses and free markets at a time when corporations and deregulation are 
under heavy attack in Congress (Philips, July 29, 2002, WSJ). It is not obvious whether the 
Homeland Security bill is beneficial or costly for business. This bill established a new Homeland 
Security Department that presumably enhances the security of the country but increases 
government expenditures at the same time.
 20 
In addition, to capture news about accounting scandals or economic statistics, I search the 
WSJ for news reports with their subjects including “scandals”, “securities fraud”, “economy”, 
“economic conditions”, or “economic statistics.” News about accounting scandals and economic 
statistics is summarized in Table 2 Panel A columns (2) and (3) respectively. The reports on 
economic news in the period largely show a mixed tone, with no significant good or bad 
indication. As a result, economic news is unlikely the driver of the huge losses of the period. 
Around event 14 (7/8-7/12/2002), major contemporaneous events include the WorldCom 
hearing (7/8), the debate on the Homeland Security bill in the House committees (7/10, 7/11), 
and the rulemaking related to tax shelters (7/9, 7/11). The House Financial Services Committee 
held a hearing of the WorldCom scandal starting at 1 p.m. July 8. The witnesses were former 
WorldCom executives and the Salomon Smith Barney analyst Jack Grubman. Both the ex-CEO 
and the ex-CFO of WorldCom invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer questions. 
                                                 
20 According to the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005, the spending on security of 2005 
will be higher than that of 2001 by over $20 billion. If the incremental spending is capitalized in perpetuity at a 10% 
discount rate, the total additional expense is about $200 billion. Even if all the costs are borne by public firms, if  
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As a result, it is unclear that the hearing revealed any new information about accounting scandals 
to the market. On the same day, the Senate met at 2 p.m. and started debate on Sarbanes’ bill 
soon afterwards (Congressional Record, S.6327). I examine the intraday value-weighted market 
return from 1 to 2 p.m. and from 2:05 to 3:05 p.m. The market return in the one hour after 
WorldCom’s hearing started was 0.16%, while the market return in the one hour after the Senate 
debate started was about -0.42%. As the exact starting and ending time of the hearing and the 
debate was unavailable and the two events overlapped in time, no strong conclusion can be 
drawn from the evidence. However, it suggests that the WorldCom hearing itself likely does not 
explain the negative return of July 8.  
The rulemaking activities related to the Homeland Security bill were very preliminary 
around event 14. The House committees voted against some of the President’s proposals, such as 
merging the Secret Service (7/10) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (7/11) into 
the new department. However, news reports indicated that it was unclear how important these 
votes were, given that a special Select Committee could override the votes and write the bill that 
would go to the House floor (Pincus et al., July 11, 2002, WP). Indeed, the bills later proposed by 
the Select Committee overrode some of the earlier votes (Calmes, July 18, 2002, WSJ). Thus, the 
votes around event 14 are likely to have a limited impact on stock prices. Moreover, their effect 
on the cumulative return of the period likely cancels out the impact of subsequent rulemaking 
progress.  
The House Appropriations Committee voted on July 9 to deny future federal contracts to 
American multinationals that relocate offshore to avoid U.S. taxes (Rogers, July 10, 2002, WSJ). 
However, the provision was later removed from the appropriations bill on July 18 in the House 
debate (Johnston, July 19, 2002, NYT). Again, the overall impact of these activities on the 
cumulative return of the period is likely to be minimal. Rep. Thomas proposed a bill related to 
firms seeking foreign tax havens, but it is unclear whether the bill really attacks tax shelters, 
according to the news report (McKinnon, July 12, 2002, WSJ). Further, the bill was at a very 
early stage of the rulemaking process and unlikely to generate a significant impact on stock 
prices. 
                                                                                                                                                              
there is no benefit associated with additional security activities, and if all the expected costs are reflected in the 
abnormal return of July 2002, the costs are still insufficient to explain the losses in July 2002.  
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I obtain the timing of the President’s speech on July 9 from the White House website and 
compute stock returns around the speech. The method to compute the intraday returns and to 
construct the statistical test is summarized in Appendix 3. The results are reported in Table 2 
Panel B. Stock prices began to decline in the middle of the President’s speech. The stock return 
in the last 10 minutes of the President’s speech accounts for 18% of the negative return of the 
whole day. As the event window is significantly narrowed, the documented intraday return is less 
likely to reflect the effect of other contemporaneous events. 
Around event 16 (7/18-7/23/2002), the trade bill was first mentioned in news reports. I 
expect positive market reactions to the reported progress of the bill and thus this event is unlikely 
to explain the negative return of July 18, 2002. The negative return of July 22 could be related to 
the announcement of the bankruptcy of WorldCom on July 21. However, as the bankruptcy was 
announced during the weekend, I expect a significant negative return at the opening of the 
market, if the negative return of July 22 was driven by this event. The previous-close-to-open 
return of July 22 was -0.32%, but it was not statistically significant. Moreover, the negative 
return reversed within fifteen minutes after the opening of the market (unreported). The evidence 
shows that the bankruptcy of WorldCom is unlikely the key driver of the large negative return of 
the day. The pattern of intraday returns of July 22 is also plotted in Table 2 Panel C. 
The major contemporaneous event around event 17 (7/24-7/26/2002) is the arrest of five 
Adelphia executives. Adelphia executives were arrested around 6 a.m. in the morning of July 24 
(Markon et al., July 25, 2002, WSJ). The conference committee of the accounting bill met and 
reached an agreement in the morning and the content of the conference report was revealed 
during the day, though the exact timing is not available.
21 If stock returns on July 24 mainly 
reflect the effect of the arrest of Adelphia executives, I expect a significant positive return right 
after the opening of the market. However, the opening return of July 24 was negative, 
inconsistent with this hypothesis. The negative opening return is consistent with the explanation 
that the arrest signaled a change of attitude of the government and increased the likelihood that a 
tough rule would pass. The pattern of intraday returns of July 24 in Panel C also shows that 
positive returns were realized during the day, not at the opening of the stock market. 
                                                 
21 I could search Dow Jones Newswire and find the stamped time of the first news report to test the intraday market 
reactions (Barclay et al., 1988). However, I find that the stamped time of the reports is inaccurate. For example, the 
President gave a speech on July 29 at 11:00 a.m. However, I find a news report stamped at 10:07 a.m., talking about  
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In summary, although there were other rulemaking activities, accounting scandals, and 
economic news reported from July 8 to July 26, 2002, these news releases alone are unlikely to 
give rise to the huge negative return of the period. Yet, it is possible that the above investigation 
does not capture all the news announcements that moved the market index. Other news such as 
earnings announcements could provide additional information regarding the business conditions 
and cause stock prices to decline. However, 65% of the negative return (value-weighted) of 2002 
is realized in the 15-day event window from July 8 to July 26. If one assumes that earnings news 
of similar nature was announced around the event and non-event days of 2002, the event-period 
return is too large to be explained by the economic downturn. Also, the economic recession in 
2002 and the news announcements regarding accounting scandals are not totally independent of 
SOX. The scandals could have caused anti-business rulemaking, the immediate consequence of 
which was SOX. It is likely that future adverse government regulations were also forecasted by 
the market which further weakened the economy and deepened the recession.  
In contrast to Razaee and Jain (2003) and Li et al. (2004), I do not include the presidential 
approval of the Act (July 30) as a major event related to SOX. After the Act was passed in the 
House on July 25, the President urged the Senate to pass the bill so that he could sign it into law.
 
He also indicated when he commended the Senate after the Act was passed that he looked 
forward to signing the bill into law.
22 The President’s comments revealed a strong indication that 
he would sign the bill and thus his approval was well expected.  
However, both Razaee and Jain (2003) and Li et al. (2004) find a significant positive 
cumulative return around the three-day window from July 29 to July 31. The value-weighted 
returns for the three days are: July 29, 5.31%; July 30, 0.47%; and, July 31, 0.58%. Only the 
return of July 29 (Monday) is significantly different from zero. I argue that the positive return of 
July 29 is likely explained by the passage of the Trade Act of 2002 or the Homeland Security bill 
in the House after the close of the stock market on July 26 (Friday). If so, I expect to see a 
significant positive return at the opening of the market on July 29. Table 2 Panel B shows that the 
previous-close-to-open return accounted for almost 40% of the daily return of July 29. 
Unreported results reveal that the realized market return within one hour after the opening of the 
market accounted for 66% of the daily return. The findings strongly suggest that the significant 
                                                                                                                                                              
the speech as if it had been given. It is hard to use the inaccurate time to distinguish the impact of confounding 
events that occur on the same date. 
22 These comments can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/.  
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positive return of July 29 was driven by news released prior to the opening of stock market on 
that day. I also search the Dow Jones Newswire from July 26 to July 29 for any news about 
President Bush. A news report on July 29 indicates that the President gave a speech regarding the 
welfare reform that day, in which he explicitly announced that he would sign the bill on July 30. 
There was no significant market movement during his speech. While the market return in the ten 
minutes after his speech is significantly positive, the magnitude of the return is only about one-
tenth of the opening return. The positive return could also reflect the impact of other information 
in his speech, as the speech is not mainly about accounting reforms. Thus, most, if not all, of the 
significant positive return around the presidential approval was unrelated to SOX. The positive 
return on July 29 should not be included in the test of market reactions to the Act. 
I also search for significant news announcements around event 2. On the same day as the 
Treasury Secretary’s talk (February 2, 2002, Saturday), the Powers report was released indicating 
that the Chicago office of Andersen was well aware of accounting problems at Enron. The report 
suggested that Andersen did not function as an effective check on the disclosure reported by 
Enron (Chaney and Philipich, 2002). There would have been a negative market reaction to the 
report if it changed investors’ expectation of the reliability of financial reporting and audit 
quality. I cannot distinguish which event gave rise to the negative return on February 4, 2002. 
 
Subsequent events 
Li et al. (2004) examine both the events leading to the passage of SOX and several events 
related to the implementation of SOX that occurred between August and December 2002. 
However, they only examine a subsample of legislative events subsequent to SOX. To 
investigate whether the post-SOX implementation events changed the expected costs of SOX, I 
examine a more comprehensive set of events related to the rulemaking activities directed by 
SOX. 
The events subsequent to SOX largely involve rulemaking activities of the SEC and the 
PCAOB, and are discussed in Appendix 1 Panel B. Table 3 reports the raw and abnormal market 
returns around these legislative events. Most of the subsequent rulemaking events are not 
associated with significant market reactions. It shows that the implementation of SOX did not 
significantly change its implications. As a result of the inclusion of many insignificant events in 
the test, the cumulative abnormal return around all SOX-related events is significantly negative  
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only when historical volatility is used in the test. However, the cumulative abnormal return over 
all significant events is still significantly negative. 
 
Cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns around the rule-making events 
 
Research design, sample selection, and descriptive statistics 
The regression to test the cross-sectional implication of major provisions of SOX (H2 – 




jInd a ∑ 0  + a1 Nonauditi + a2 Incentivei + a3 Gindexi + a4 Busi_linesi + a5 
Foreigni + a6 Sizei + a7 MTBi + a8 ROAi + a9 Pre_Reti + ei       
 (2) 
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return of firm i. In the subsequent tests, I investigate 
how abnormal returns cumulated over different horizons and abnormal returns around the events 
associated with significant changes in investors’ expectations vary with firm characteristics. I 
estimate the market model for each firm using their 2001 daily return data.
23 Abnormal returns 
are then computed as the prediction errors. Cumulative abnormal returns are the sum of the 
prediction errors based on the estimated parameters.
 24 
H2 examines the impact of the provision on nonaudit services. I collect the nonaudit fee 
data from firms’ fiscal 2001 proxy statements via Lexis/Nexis. The variable Nonaudit is then 
constructed to capture firms’ purchases of nonaudit services from their auditors. It equals a firm’s 
nonaudit fees minus fees paid to the auditor for tax-related services, deflated by the market value 
of equity of the firm at the end of 2001. Fees paid to the auditor for tax-related services are 
excluded because they are not subject to the restriction of nonaudit services and they constitute a 
substantial portion of nonaudit fees paid to the auditor.
25 If the purchase of nonaudit services is a 
                                                 
23 Both equal-weighted and value-weighted index returns are used to estimate the market model parameters and yield 
very similar results in the cross-sectional tests. Only results based on the equal-weighted index are reported. 
24 The market model abnormal returns are likely to underestimate the impact of regulatory events on individual 
firms, as the market as a whole is affected by these events (Lo, 2003). This problem is crucial in a test of the value 
implication of legislation. However, it is less important in the cross-sectional test, as the relative, rather than the 
absolute magnitude, of returns matters. Lo (2003) also examines regulatory events and uses market model abnormal 
returns in his cross-sectional test. 
25 Neither Sarbanes’ bill nor the final act banned tax-related services. About 45% of the firms in my sample 
separately disclosed the amount of fees for tax-related services. For firms that did not disclose the detailed fee items,  
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result of cost efficiency reasons rather than an intention to buy a favorable audit opinion, a1 
should be negative. 
H3 examines whether firms that compensate CEOs with more incentive-based pay benefit 
(lose) more from SOX. The variable of interest is thus the ratio of incentive pay, including option 
grants, restricted stocks, bonus, and long-term incentive payouts, to the total compensation of the 
CEO (Incentive), measured at the end of 2001. Compensation data is obtained from ExecuComp. 
The variable Incentive is likely influenced by firm performance. CEOs in poorly performing 
firms probably lost their bonus and thus the percentage of incentive pay in their total pay would 
be low. I control for firm performance by adding return on assets (ROA) and the market-adjusted 
returns of 2001 (Pre_Ret). If the provision on incentive pay has a negative impact on firms, a2 is 
expected to be negative. 
Corporate governance is measured by the governance index (Gindex) of IRRC database 
as of 2002. The governance data on IRRC is only available for every other year. As the 
governance structure is likely sticky, I assume that the governance index of 2002 does not differ 
significantly from that of 2001. I also conduct the tests using governance data of 2000. The tenor 
of the results does not change. The higher the value of the index, presumably the weaker is the 
governance system. H4 predicts that a3 is negative if the provisions to enhance corporate 
governance are costly. 
The complexity of business is measured by the number of four-digit SIC industries of 
each firm (Busi_lines) and a dummy variable to capture whether a firm is involved in 
transactions with foreign parties or has foreign operations (Foreign).  Foreign equals one if 
foreign currency adjustment is non-zero, and zero otherwise. H5 predicts a4 and a5  to be 
negative.  
Size and MTB are also included in the regression. Size is measured as the logarithm of the 
market value of equity of each firm at the end of 2001. Market-to-book ratio (MTB) is defined as 
the market value of equity over the book value of equity at the end of 2001. Firms’ purchases of 
nonaudit services, compensation structures, and corporate governance are likely affected by firm 
size and investment opportunities. Firms with more growth options could lose more investment 
opportunities as a result of tight controls and higher litigation risks, which predicts a negative 
                                                                                                                                                              
I use the total nonaudit fees in the tests. Investors could not determine whether the services would be affected by 
SOX if detailed fee items were not disclosed. As a result, it is reasonable to use the total fees for these firms.  
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relation between CAR and growth options. There is no clear prediction for the sign of the relation 
between  CAR  and  Size. Although small firms may incur disproportionately greater direct 
compliance costs, large firms could be subject to proportionately greater litigation and political 
costs as an indirect result of SOX or future legislation. The Indjs are industry dummies and are 
defined as in Frankel et al. (2002) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003). The exclusion of industry 
dummies does not affect the results. 
To be included in the sample for the cross-sectional test, I require that firms have return 
data from CRSP, financial data from Compustat, compensation data from Execucomp, 
governance data from IRRC, and nonaudit fee data from proxy statements. Execucomp and the 
IRRC database largely cover S&P 1,500 firms. The final sample includes 1,409 observations. 
The extreme 1% of each continuous variable is winsorized. Descriptive statistics are reported in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 Panel A shows the sample selection procedures. Although the number of firms 
only accounts for about 20% of the CRSP population, the market value of these firms constitutes 
over 90% of the total market capitalization of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Panel B reports the 
average raw returns of the sample around the events leading to SOX. The pattern of raw returns 
around the events mimics that of the whole market presented in Table 1. The raw returns around 
events 2, 14, 16, and 17 are significant. The magnitude of the average raw returns of this sample 
is also comparable to that of the value-weighted raw returns of the market. Panel C presents firm 
characteristic variables. The average firm size in the sample is significantly larger than an 
average firm in the CRSP universe. Panel D reports the Pearson correlation between variables. 
As expected, Incentive is positively correlated with ROA and MTB.  Size is significantly 
correlated with all the variables, while MTB is negatively correlated with Nonaudit. 
 
Regression results 
The estimation results of regression (2) are reported in Table 5. Because the event dates 
are clustered, cross-sectional correlation of returns may result in biased standard errors and 
potentially incorrect inferences (Sefcik and Thompson, 1986; Bernard, 1987). Moreover, the 
association between abnormal returns and firm characteristics could be explained by other 
documented regularities. For example, a negative correlation between abnormal returns and the 
governance index could be driven by the regularities found by Gompers et al. (2003). As a  
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consequence, I compute both bootstrapped p-values and the asymptotic p-values of the OLS 
regression.
26  
Table 5 Panel A shows the estimation results of regression (2) with CAR as the dependent 
variable. The examined cumulative abnormal returns are abnormal returns cumulated over the 
three significant events in July (events 14, 16, and 17, CAR_3E), cumulated over the four 
significant events (events 2, 14, 16, and 17, CAR_4E), cumulated over all the events (events 1 to 
17, CAR_ALL), and cumulated from June 25 to July 26 (CAR_JJ). Both the OLS two-tailed p-
values and bootstrapped one-tailed p-values show similar inferences.  
The coefficient on Nonaudit is significantly negative in all four regressions, suggesting 
that the restriction of nonaudit services is value decreasing for firms. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that employing the auditor as a consultant more likely reflects cost-efficiency than an 
intention to buy favorable audit opinions.  
The coefficient on Incentive is insignificant. Although Cohen et al. (2004b) document a 
significant decline both in the ratio of incentive pay to salary and in the level of investments after 
SOX, the return test in this paper does not find a significant association between incentive pay 
and firms’ abnormal returns. 
Probably the most startling finding is that firms’ abnormal returns decrease with the 
governance index, which contradicts the conventional wisdom that stronger governance increases 
firm value. It suggests that the requirement to tighten corporate governance is generally value 
decreasing for firms. Given that SOX is primarily characterized as an act to enhance corporate 
governance, the result casts substantial doubt on the value of the rules, assuming Gindex at least 
partly captures the stringency of corporate governance.  
The coefficient on Busi_lines is significantly negative, consistent with the hypothesis that 
the costs of complying with Section 404 are significant. The more business lines a firm has, the 
greater decline there is in firm value. The coefficient on Foreign is significantly negative in three 
out of the four regressions, providing some support for H5. 
                                                 
26 Based on Lo (2003)’s method, the bootstrapped p-values are calculated as follows: One-tailed p-values are the 
percentage of 1,000 repetitions that generate coefficients greater than the OLS coefficients in the table (less than the 
OLS coefficient if it is negative). For the cumulative return regression (e.g., CAR over event 14, 16 and 17), each 
repetition uses sample firms’ abnormal returns from 12 random nonevent days selected from 2002 or 2003. If the 
event days are consecutive, I select consecutive nonevent days similarly. I then cumulate each firm’s abnormal 
returns to obtain CAR. For regressions with abnormal returns around individual events as the dependent variable, the 
procedure is similar. Consecutive nonevent days are selected and the number of days selected equals the number of 
days in the event window of each event.  
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The coefficient on MTB is largely insignificant; MTB is likely correlated with other firm 
characteristics and measures investment opportunities with noise. The coefficient on Size is 
positive but insignificant. The coefficient on ROA is significantly negative. It could be that 
investors expect firms with higher accounting earnings to have manipulated accounting numbers 
or that investors expect them to face greater litigation risks. Consistent with this explanation, 
after firms’ accruals and other proxies for litigation risks are added to the regression in the 
sensitivity analysis (see Table 7), the coefficient on ROA largely ceases to be significant. 
Table 5 Panel B reports the estimation results of regression (2) with CAR*S  as the 
dependent variable, where CAR is firms’ abnormal returns around the key events that revised 
investors’ expectations, and S is an indicator variable that equals one for events 2, 14, and 16 (the 
events with negative market abnormal returns) and minus one for event 17 (the event with a 
positive return).
27 Hypotheses 2-5 predict that the sign of the coefficients in regression (2) 
depends on the cross-sectional implication of SOX and the direction in which each event revised 
investors’ expectations. The results in Table 1 suggest that event 17 was associated with a 
reduction in expected costs of SOX. Consequently, in the cross-sectional tests, the sign of CAR 
for this event is reversed so that the estimated coefficients have the same signs as predicted by 
H2-H5 (Leftwich, 1981). Regression (2) is estimated separately for the four significant events.  
Little cross-sectional variation is found for event 2. This is not surprising. The Treasury 
Secretary’s talk sent a signal to the market that new regulations were on the way, but there was 
no clear indication how the laws would be written. The coefficient on Gindex is significant with 
the sign predicted by the cost hypothesis in the regressions for events 14, 16, and 17. When the 
likelihood of passing tough rules increased, firms with weak governance were struck harder and 
experienced greater losses. In contrast, when it was revealed that tougher requirements would not 
be imposed, firms with weak governance experienced higher abnormal returns. The coefficient 
on Busi_lines is also significant with the expected sign in the three regressions. The results of 
Nonaudit are weaker.
28 The coefficient on Nonaudit is insignificant in the regression for event 14 
                                                 
27 I also conduct the event-by-event cross-sectional test using the methodology developed in Sefcik and Thompson 
(1986). The inferences remain intact. 
28 There could be several explanations for the weaker results on Nonaudit. First, the variable contains measurement 
errors. Although the calculation of Nonaudit excludes fees for tax-related services that are not affected by SOX, fees 
paid for other unrestricted services such as statutory audit are not excluded. Firms usually report such fees in the 
audit-related nonaudit services category. However, audit-related nonaudit fees likely include other items such as fees 
for assistance in internal audit. As a result, it is hard to separate these fee items. Second, the restriction of nonaudit 
services likely affects all firms, since it eliminates the choice of employing the auditor as a consultant.  
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and the sign of the coefficient on Nonaudit  is inconsistent with the cost hypothesis in the 
regression for event 17. The sign of the coefficient on Incentive is significantly positive in two 
regressions, though in Panel A, the coefficient is always insignificant. One potential explanation 
is that the direction of changes in investors’ expectations concerning one specific provision could 
differ from the direction of changes in investors’ overall expectations of the Act. As the Act 
primarily targets corporate governance, changes in investors’ expectations regarding governance 
are consistent with changes in investors’ overall expectation of the Act. Accordingly, the results 
on  Gindex are more consistent in the regressions. Overall, most of the results support the 
hypothesis that major provisions of SOX are costly.
  
It is possible that there is a fixed component of private benefits or costs that does not vary 
with firm characteristics. The fixed private benefits can be interpreted as one type of positive 
externality, such as restoring investor confidence in the stock market. However, as the overall 
cumulative market reaction to the rulemaking is negative, there is no evidence that this kind of 
positive externality is sufficient to offset the private costs of SOX on firms. Note, however, social 
benefits or externalities of SOX could manifest themselves in other forms and the evaluation of 
all the social costs and benefits goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
In summary, the results of the cross-sectional return test differ substantially from those 
documented in related working papers. Three out of the four major provisions tested are 
demonstrated to have significant negative economic consequences. The cross-sectional test 
provides further support for the hypothesis that SOX is likely costly. 
 
Market reactions to the announcement of postponing the compliance dates of Section 404 
Table 6 Panel A summarizes the predictions of H6. H6a predicts that investors consider 
the postponement to be bad news and thus early adopters would experience higher abnormal 
returns. In contrast, H6b predicts that the postponement is good news and therefore late adopters 
would experience higher abnormal returns. 
If a firm has a market capitalization less than $75 million by the end of 2002, I classify it 
as a nonaccelerated filer. Note that some of the nonaccelerated filers could be misclassified as 
accelerated filers, if their total market value of equity is greater than $75 million but the market 
value of equity excluding shares held by insiders is less than $75 million or they do not satisfy 
other criteria for an accelerated filer (see footnote 5 on page 6 for the definition of an accelerated  
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filer). I exclude foreign firms and banks, as the expected compliance costs of foreign firms and 
banks prior to the announcement of the final rule were likely different from those of the other 
firms. For example, since large banks had been required to file an internal control report to the 
FDIC before SOX, banks were lobbying for a waiver of compliance with Section 404. The final 
rule of the SEC allows large banks to file one report both to the FDIC and to comply with 
Section 404. The inclusion of these firms does not affect the tenor of the results. 
I employ the following regression to examine the cross-sectional variation in market 
reactions to the announcement, 
CARi = a0 + a1 Non_Acci + a2 Late_Noni + a3 Late_Acci + a4 MTBi + a5 Sizei + ei 
 (3) 
where Late_Non equals one for nonaccelerated filers that obtain two years of extension 
and zero otherwise, and Late_Acc equals one for accelerated filers that obtain one year of 
extension and zero otherwise. The variable Non_Acc equals one for nonaccelerated filers and 
zero for accelerated filers. H6a (H6b) predicts that ceteris paribus, late adopters experienced 
lower (higher) abnormal returns and thus a2 and a3 are expected to be negative (positive). I do not 
have predictions regarding the difference in reaction between accelerated and nonaccelerated 
filers. As accelerated and nonaccelerated filers are treated differently under some other SEC 
rules, investors could have expected the SEC to treat them differently in this case. Thus, the sign 
of a1 is indeterminate.  
The estimation results are reported in Table 6 Panel B. The dependent variable is 
abnormal returns cumulated over days (-1, 1), (-3, 1), and (-5, 1) around the announcement day 
respectively. The regression with CAR (-1, 1) as the dependent variable does not provide support 
for either H6a or H6b. However, the regressions with CAR  (-3, 1) and CAR (-5, 1) as the 
dependent variable show that nonaccelerated filers that obtained two years of extension realized 
significantly higher abnormal returns than nonaccelerated filers that obtained one year of 
extension, consistent with H6b. The coefficients on Size  and  MTB  are largely insignificant. 
Unreported results based on CAR (-4, 1) and CAR (-6, 1) show similar inferences. The findings 
suggest that there could be news leakage prior to the release of the final rule. It is not surprising 
that the difference between the early and late adopters in the accelerated filers group is 
insignificant. Given the relatively large fixed costs of Section 404 compliance, the cost savings as 
a percentage of the market value of large firms likely are smaller than those of small firms.   
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Table 6 Panel B shows that the cost savings of delaying compliance for one more year are 
about 1.42% (from the regression with CAR (-5, 1) as the dependent variable) of the market value 
of an average firm in the nonaccelerated filers group. The average market capitalization of a 
nonaccelerated filer is $28 million, which suggests that the estimated cost savings are about $0.4 
million. The average annual revenue of the nonaccelerated filers is $91 million. The FEI January 
2004 survey indicates that the direct initial compliance costs for a firm with an annual revenue 
between $25 and $99 million are about $0.74 million and the opportunity costs are likely to be 
even greater. Compared with FEI’s cost estimates, the magnitude of the cost savings of delaying 
compliance for one year appears reasonable. 
In summary, the results in Table 6 provide support for H6b. The compliance costs of 
Section 404 are particularly significant for small firms and delaying compliance is beneficial for 
them. 
 
Alternative explanations and sensitivity analyses 
 
Alternative explanations 
Based on the analysis in Section 4.1.3, it appears unlikely that all the abnormal market 
returns around the rulemaking event days can be attributed to SOX. First, both SOX and the 
message conveyed by SOX about future legislation affected stock prices and their impact cannot 
be disentangled. Although the cumulative abnormal return in the legislative period is negative, I 
cannot decisively conclude that SOX itself is costly. Yet, it is likely that the passage of SOX 
conveys bad news to the market because SOX is costly and it starts a new anti-business 
legislative era. If SOX were beneficial, it is more plausible that investors would expect the 
government to write similar beneficial legislation in the future. Moreover, the cross-sectional 
tests in Section 4.3 provide additional support for the conjecture that SOX is costly. It is not clear 
why the expected costs of future anti-business legislation should vary systematically with firms’ 
purchases of nonaudit services, corporate governance, and the complexity of firms’ business. 
One possible explanation is that since SOX imposes costs on firms with more flexible corporate 
governance, investors expect future legislation to continue scrutinizing these firms and impose 
greater costs. The explanation itself supports the hypothesis that the examined provisions impose 
net private costs on firms.  
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Further, the documented cumulative abnormal returns likely incorporate market reactions 
to contemporaneous news announcements. However, the cross-sectional tests provide supporting 
evidence for the connection between SOX-related legislative activities and abnormal returns. If 
most of the market reactions reflected economic news unrelated to the rulemaking movements, 
firms’ abnormal returns would not vary cross-sectionally as predicted. The examination of other 
contemporary news announcements in July 2002 also suggests that SOX is likely the driver of 
the negative cumulative abnormal return in that period. While one cannot attribute all the 
documented losses to SOX, the cross-sectional tests and the examination of market reactions to 
the deferment of Section 404 are consistent with the private costs of SOX outweighing the 
private benefits. 
In addition, as the market expectation of the government reaction to accounting scandals 
is unobservable, I cannot completely rule out the hypothesis that SOX was beneficial but 
investors had expected different rules to correct the market failures and were dissatisfied with 
SOX. For example, investors could have expected strict legislation when the WorldCom scandal 
was exposed but were disappointed that President Bush was not tough enough in his speech on 
July 9. As a result, there would have been a negative market reaction around his speech. 
However, to justify this explanation, proponents who argue that SOX is beneficial have to 
document significant benefits of SOX that outweigh the approximately $1.4 trillion of costs 
computed in Section 4.1.3. 
The key variables in the cross-sectional regression, such as Nonaudit,  Incentive, and 
Gindex, are not exogenous. Although regression (2) controls for firm size, investment 
opportunities, and firm performance, these variables could be correlated with other firm 
characteristics. For example, distressed firms are likely to purchase more consulting services to 
improve business operations. They are also more likely to become the targets of lawsuits. SOX 
increases the litigation costs of firms and executives and thus firms’ abnormal returns around the 
legislative events are likely decreasing with their litigation risks. To mitigate the omitted 
correlated variables problem, I include additional controls for litigation risks in regression (2).  
Lys and Watts (1994) find that the probability of lawsuit is a function of the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, the likelihood of acquisition, firms’ accruals, and whether a qualified audit opinion is 
issued. Since only one firm in my sample received a qualified audit opinion in 2001, I use 
proxies for the other three factors to control for litigation risks. I estimate the likelihood of  
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bankruptcy (Bankrupt) following Shumway (2001)’s model. The variable Acquisition equals one 
if a firm is subsequently acquired and delisted in 2003. The variable Accrual is defined as firms’ 
total accruals deflated by total assets. Table 7 reports the estimation results. The addition of these 
proxies for litigation risks does not change the main results of Table 5. I also estimate an 
aggregate measure for litigation risks, which is calculated based on Shu (2000, Table 3)’s model 
to predict the likelihood of lawsuits (not reported). Again, the inclusion of the aggregate measure 
does not affect the main results of Table 5. 
 
Sensitivity tests 
To test the impact of the disclosure requirement of SOX, I examine whether CAR varies 
with firms’ disclosure practices. I use the S&P financial disclosure rating to proxy for disclosure 
quality and add it to regression (2). Because the rating is only available for S&P 500 firms, the 
introduction of this variable reduces the sample to 421 firms. The financial disclosure rating is 
not significantly associated with CAR. The coefficient Nonaudit is still significantly negative. 
The coefficient on Gindex is insignificant, but the change is due to the reduction of sample size 
rather than the inclusion of a new variable. The coefficient on Gindex is still insignificant for the 
small sample without the inclusion of the financial disclosure rating. 
I also estimate regression (2) using alternative definitions of variables. I use the three-year 
average of Incentive instead the value of this variable in 2001 and all inferences remain intact. I 
also redefine Nonaudit as the logarithm of total nonaudit fees minus fees for tax related services, 
or the ratio of nonaudit fees over audit fees. Ferguson et al. (2004) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 
use the logarithm of nonaudit fees without deflation to examine the impact of nonaudit services 
on audit independence. The use of this variable does not change the inferences. However, the 
coefficient on Nonaudit becomes insignificant when the fee ratio is used. Although prior research 
(e.g., Frankel et al., 2002) employs this variable to test the implication of nonaudit services, the 
measure is criticized for not capturing the economic significance of the services to the firm or to 
the auditor (Ferguson et al., 2004; Frankel et al., 2002), which is important in the return test. As a 
result, I do not rely on the results based on this measure. 
In the cross-sectional tests, I estimate the market model for individual firms using data 
prior to the first event to obtain the parameters and I calculate AR as the prediction error. 
Alternatively, following Schipper and Thompson (1983), I estimate the market model using data  
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prior to and during the event period, allowing the intercept to shift around the event days. The 
coefficients on event-day dummies are then aggregated to compute CAR. I re-estimate regression 
(2) with CAR computed in this way as the dependent variable. All inferences remain intact. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper investigates the economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act through a 
study of market reactions around the legislative events prior and subsequent to the passage of 
SOX. I find that the cumulative abnormal return around the legislative events leading to SOX is 
significantly negative. The abnormal returns are largely insignificant around the events related to 
the implementation of SOX. The evidence reveals that investors likely consider the Act to be 
costly and/or the information conveyed by the passage of the Act to be bad news for business. 
The impact of other contemporaneous news announcements is also incorporated into the 
abnormal return, but a further examination of intraday returns shows that such announcements 
are unlikely the key driver of the negative returns in July 2002. 
Further, I investigate the sources of costs by examining the cross-sectional implication of 
major provisions of SOX. I find that firms’ cumulative abnormal returns are decreasing with their 
purchases of nonaudit services and the complexity of their business. These findings suggest that 
the restriction of nonaudit services and Section 404, the new requirement of the internal control 
tests, are costly. Most significantly, I find that firms with perceived weak governance experience 
more negative abnormal returns around the events that increase the likelihood of passing tough 
governance rules. The results show that these firms do not benefit from enhanced governance as 
commonly expected, but actually lose more as a result of SOX. This finding challenges the value 
of SOX, as it is primarily characterized as legislation “improving” corporate governance to 
increase shareholder value. Finally, the test of market reactions to the announcement of 
postponing compliance with Section 404 shows that the postponement is particularly beneficial 
for small firms. 
Several caveats apply in interpreting the results. First, the documented negative 
cumulative abnormal return in the rulemaking period likely incorporates the impact of SOX, the 
expected costs of future anti-business legislation, and the impact of other contemporaneous news 
announcements. Not all of the documented negative cumulative return can be directly attributed  
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to SOX. However, the cross-sectional test of the paper provides support for the argument that 
SOX is likely costly and at least part of the documented negative cumulative abnormal returns to 
the rulemaking events are related to SOX. Although the year 2002 saw an economic recession, 
the fact that 65% of the losses of the year (252 trading days) were realized in the most significant 
rulemaking period (15 trading days) suggests that the recession is unlikely to fully explain the 
event-period losses. Second, as the market expectation is unobservable, I cannot completely rule 
out an alternative explanation that the losses reflect investors’ disappointment with SOX. Future 
research that further distinguishes this alternative explanation and the cost explanation could 
provide stronger evidence regarding the impact of SOX. Additionally, this paper focuses on an 
examination of private benefits and costs of SOX. Research on the social benefits and costs of 
the Act will help depict a more complete picture of SOX.  
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Appendix 1: Description of the legislative events related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The following tables summarize legislative events related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Date 
column shows the date when each event took place. The Event column lists descriptions of the 
events. The WSJ column presents the date when the Wall Street Journal first revealed 
information about the event, the major content of a speech, a legislative proposal or a new rule, 
or the result of a vote. The WP column shows the reporting date for each event of the Washington 
Post. The events are numbered and overlapping events are grouped together into one event. 
 
 
Panel A: Events prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Event 
Number  Date Event WSJ  WP 




2 2/2/2002  Treasury Secretary called for changes in rules 
governing corporations  2/4/2002  
3 2/13/2002  Oxley introduced his accounting reform bill in the 





4 2/28/2002  House Democrats introduced legislation that would 
impose more restrictions than Oxley’s proposal   3/1/2002 
5 3/7/2002  Bush’s first response to accounting scandals unveiled; 
Senate reportedly drafted tough reform bills  3/7/2002 3/7/2002 
6 3/26/2002  Greenspan warned against too much regulation  3/27/2002  
7 4/11/2002 
House Financial Services Committee scheduled to 
vote on Oxley’s bill, but the vote was postponed 





8 4/16/2002  Oxley’s bill passed in the Committee  4/17/2002 4/17/2002 
9 4/24/2002  Oxley’s bill passed in the House  4/25/2002 4/25/2002 
 4/25/2002  Senate Judiciary Committee approved legislation 
bolstering corporate frauds laws  4/26/2002 4/26/2002 
10 5/8/2002  Sarbanes circulated his reform bill in the Senate 
Banking Committee  5/9/2002  5/8/2002 
5/9/2002 
11 6/11/2002  The WSJ reported that Democrats in the Senate 
Banking Committee united behind Sarbanes’ bill  6/11/2002  
 6/12/2002  SEC proposed rules to require CEOs and CFOs of the 
largest 1000 firms to certify financial reports  6/12/2002 6/13/2002 
12 6/18/2002  Senate Banking Committee passed Sarbanes’ bill  6/19/2002 6/19/2002 
13 6/25/2002  WorldCom admitted that they understated expenses by 
$3.8 billion 
6/26/2002 






Number  Date Event WSJ  WP 





 7/9/2002  Bush delivered a speech on corporate reforms; news 
reports indicated the passage of Sarbanes’ bill likely  7/9/2002 7/10/2002 
 7/10/2002  Senate passed the Judiciary Committee’s proposal to 
strengthen criminal penalties 97 to 0  7/11/2002 7/11/2002 
15 7/15/2002  Senate passed Sarbanes’ bill 97 to 0  7/16/2002 7/16/2002 
 7/16/2002  House passed a bill to strengthen criminal penalties  7/17/2002 7/17/2002 
16 7/18/2002  House republican leaders reportedly retreated efforts 
to dilute the Senate’s tough bill  7/18/2002 7/18/2002 
 7/19/2002 
Conference committee started negotiations to merge 
bills and Sarbanes’ bill became the framework; 




 7/20/2002  Bush pushed to speed up rulemaking in a radio 
address  7/22/2002 7/21/2002 
 7/23/2002  Lobbyists reportedly lost their influence   7/23/2002 
17 7/24/2002  Senate and House agreed on the final rule  7/24/2002 7/24/2002 
















Panel B: Events subsequent to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley’s Act 
Event 
Number  Date Event WSJ  WP 
18 8/14/2002  Deadline for CEOs and CFOs of the 947 largest firms to 
certify their financial reports  8/15/2002 8/15/2002 
19 8/27/2002 
SEC adopted rules to require CEOs and CFOs of all 
public firms to certify their financial reports and to 
accelerate filings of statements 
8/28/2002 8/28/2002 
20 10/16/2002  SEC proposed rules concerning internal control 
assessment and disclosure of financial experts  10/17/2002 10/17/2002 
 10/18/2002  SEC budget shortage  10/21/2002 10/22/2002 
21 10/22/2002  Bush promised to increase the funding of the SEC  10/23/2002  
22 10/25/2002  Webster named Chairman of the PCAOB  10/25/2002 10/26/2002 
23 10/30/2002  SEC proposed new disclosure requirement of off-
balance sheet transactions and pro forma information  10/30/2002  
24 11/5/2002  SEC Chairman Pitt resigned  11/6/2002 11/6/2002 
 11/6/2002  SEC proposed new attorney conduct rule  11/7/2002  
25 11/12/2002  PCAOB Chairman Webster resigned  11/12/2002 11/13/2002 
26 11/19/2002  SEC proposed auditor independence rule  11/19/2002 11/19/2002 
27 1/8/2003  SEC proposed listing standards rules  1/9/2003 1/9/2003 
28 1/15/2003 
SEC adopted rules regarding the pro forma earnings 
report, trading during blackout periods, and audit 
committee financial expert requirement 
1/16/2003 1/16/2003 
29 1/22/2003  SEC adopted rules on auditor independence and 
disclosure of off-balance-sheet transactions  1/23/2003 1/23/2002 
 1/23/2003  SEC adopted attorney conduct rule  1/24/2003 1/24/2003 
30 5/21/2003  McDonough named Chairman of the PCAOB  5/22/2003 5/22/2003 
31 5/27/2003  SEC adopted rules concerning management’s report on 
internal controls and postponed the compliance date  5/28/2003 5/28/2003 
32 7/28/2003  PCAOB roundtable meeting; works of PCAOB 
revealed  7/29/2003 7/29/2003 
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Appendix 3: The computation and statistical test of intraday returns 
a.   Computation of intraday returns 
Intraday security price data is obtained from NYSE TAQ database. If a security trades in 
consecutive intervals, t-1 and t, the return during interval t is estimated by Rit = (Pit – Pit-1)/Pit-1, 
where Pit is the last transaction price in interval t (Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988). The previous-
close-to-open return is calculated using the previous close price, the last transaction price within 
10 minutes before the close of the market, and the open price, the first transaction price within 10 
minutes after the opening of the market. I compute the value-weighted market return for the 
interval to facilitate a comparison with the results in Table 1. The value-weighted market return 
is,  














1 * / * *,  
where  Shrout  denotes the number of shares outstanding. If a security does not trade in 
consecutive intervals, the observation is excluded.  
 
b. Statistical tests 
Since intraday returns are not normally distributed (Busse and Green, 2002), I use nonparametric 
bootstrapping tests to determine the statistical significance of intraday returns. Specifically, to 
test whether Rt differs significantly from zero, I employ the following algorithm: 
(1) The intraday returns for the same time interval on nonevent days in 2001 and 2002 are 
computed (Sample A); 
(2) A sample (B) of 1000 intraday returns is drawn with replacement from sample A; 
(3) The bootstrapped one-tailed p-value is computed as: 
 
p = Number of observations in sample B with values greater than Rt / 1000, if Rt > 0; 
      Number of observations in sample B with values lower than Rt / 1000, if Rt < 0.  
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Appendix 4: Definition of variables 
Variable Description 
In the test of overall value implication of SOX, CAR is the cumulative abnormal market returns. 
Daily abnormal returns (AR) are computed as the difference between the raw value-weighted 
returns and the expected market returns calculated based on the following model, 
Et-1 (VWRETt) = a0 + a1 TB3Mt-1 + a2 DEFt-1 + a3 TPREt-1 + a4 DIVPRIt-5+ a5 LMVt-5+ a6 JAN 






i iD a  
TB3M is the three-month Treasury bill rate. DEF is the default premium, which is computed as the 
difference in the yields to maturity between Moody’s Baa and Aaa seasoned corporate bond indices. 
TPRE is the Treasury term structure premium, which is computed as the difference in the yields to 
maturity of the ten-year Treasury bond and the three-month Treasury bill. DIVPRI is the dividend 
price ratio. LMV is the logarithm of the value of the market portfolio. JAN equals one if day t is in 
January and DEC equals one if day t is between December 28 and 31. Dis are dummy variables for 
four of the five weekdays (Wednesday is the excluded day). The parameters of the model are 
estimated using daily data from 1986 to 2001. 
CAR 
In the cross-sectional test, I estimate the market model for each firm using their return data of 2001 
and the daily abnormal return is computed as the prediction error. Cumulative abnormal returns are 
the sum of the prediction errors. CAR_3E is cumulative abnormal returns around events 14, 16, and 
17. CAR_4E is cumulative abnormal returns around events 2, 14, 16, and 17. CAR_ALL is 
cumulative abnormal returns around events 1 to 17. CAR_JJ is cumulative abnormal returns from 
June 25 to July 26, 2002. Abnormal returns around individual events are denoted CAR. S is an 
indicator variable which equals one for events 2, 14, and 16, and minus one for event 17. 
Nonaudit  (Nonaudit fees – Fees for tax-related services) / Market value of equity at the end of 2001 
Busi_lines  Number of four-digit SIC industries of each firm in 2001 
Foreign  Equals one if foreign currency adjustment is non-zero, zero otherwise 
Incentive  (Bonus + Option Grants (Black-Scholes value) + Restricted Stocks Grants + Long-term Incentive 
Payouts) / Total Compensation, evaluated as of 2001 
Gindex  Governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) 
MTB  Market value of equity / book value of equity, evaluated at the end of 2001 
Size  Logarithm of the market value of equity, evaluated at the end of 2001 
ROA  Earnings before extraordinary items / Average total assets, evaluated at the end of 2001 
Pre_Ret  Market-adjusted return in 2001 
Late_Acc  Equals one if a firm is an accelerated filer and obtained one year of extension, zero otherwise 
Late_Non  Equals one if a firm is a nonaccelerated filer and obtained two years of extension, zero otherwise 
Non_Acc  Equals one if a firm is a nonaccelerated filer, zero otherwise 
Litigation  Probability of lawsuit, which equals 1 – 1/(1 + exp (–10.049 + 0.276*log(Total Assets) + 
1.153*(Inventory/Total Assets) + 2.075*(Receivables/Total Assets) + 1.251*ROA – 
0.088*(Current Ratio) + 1.501*Leverage + 0.301*Sales Growth – 0.371*Return – 2.309 *Stock 
Volatility + 0.235*Beta + 1.464*Stock Turnover + 1.060*Delist Dummy + 0.928*Technology 
Dummy + 0.463*Qualified Opinion Dummy)). All variables are defined following Shu (2000). 
Bankrupt  Probability of bankruptcy, calculated as 1 – 1/(1 + exp( -7.811 – 6.307 *(Net Income /Total Assets) 
+ 4.068*(Total Liabilities/Total Assets)- 0.158*(Current Ratio) + 0.307*log(Age)) (see Shumway, 
2001). 
Acquisition  Equals one if a firm is acquired and delisted in 2003, zero otherwise 
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Table 1: Raw and abnormal market returns around the events leading to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
This table reports the value-weighted raw returns and abnormal returns around legislative events leading to the passage of SOX. For each event, 
the event window is determined using the following procedure: (1) For events related to speeches, if a news report that covered major contents of 
the speech appeared in the WSJ or WP on or before the date the speech was delivered, the event window covers one day before the news report to 
one day after the speech; if a news report appeared in the WSJ or WP after a speech, the event window covers one day before the speech to one day 
after the speech. (2) For events related to legislative votes prior to the passage of SOX, as there is some uncertainty about the vote result, the event 
window covers the voting day and one day after the date. For the subsequent events related to the vote of the SEC, since there is little uncertainty 
as to the vote result, the event window is set to be one day before the event to one day after it. 
 
Panel A: Estimation of the expected return model 
The following model is employed to predict expected returns, 






i iD a     (1) 
Variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2. The parameters of the model are estimated using daily data from 1986 to 2001.  
 
  Intercept TB3Mt-1  DEFt-1  TPREt-1  DIVPRIt-5  LMVt-5  JAN  DEC  D1 D 2 D 3 D 4 
Estimate  0.0261** -0.0005** 0.0005 -0.0007**  0.7173  -0.0010* 0.0008  0.0009  -0.0008*  -0.0002  -0.0005  -0.0003 
t-stat  2.00 -2.28  0.60  -2.15  0.53  -1.92 1.37  0.62  -1.65  -0.40  -0.93  -0.68 
Number of 
observations   3993                 
Durbin-
Watson Stat    1.99                 
R
2     0.30%                               




Panel B: Raw and abnormal returns around the legislative events leading to SOX 
Abnormal returns (AR) are computed as the difference between the raw value-weighted returns and the expected market returns calculated based 
on model (1) and parameter estimates in Panel A. The t-statistics reported in this panel are based on the standard deviation of raw returns or the 
prediction errors in the estimation period (Historical), the VIX as of day t-1(VIX), or the standard deviation of raw returns or predication errors in 
the 30 days prior to day t (Rolling). CVWRET and CAR reported together with event descriptions are cumulative raw returns or abnormal returns 
around each event. Statistical tests of cumulative raw or abnormal returns for the whole period are reported at the bottom of the table.  
 
Event 
Number  Date Description  Event 
Window  CVWRET Historical  VIX  Rolling CAR  Historical  VIX Rolling 
1  1/17/2002  1/15-1/18 -0.0105  -0.53  -0.44  -0.60  -0.0163  -0.82  -0.68  -0.93 
   
SEC Chairman proposed an accounting 
overhaul plan             
2  2/2/2002  2/1-2/4 -0.0303 -2.15**  -1.63  -2.28**  -0.0309  -2.19**  -1.66*  -2.32** 
   
Treasury Secretary called for changes in 
rules governing corporations             
3  2/13/2002  2/11-2/14 0.0169  0.85  0.75  0.81  0.0144  0.73  0.64  0.70 
   
Oxley introduced an accounting reform 
bill in the House Financial Services 
Committee             
4  2/28/2002  2/27-3/1 0.0200  1.16  1.07  0.98  0.0178  1.03  0.95  0.87 
   
House Democrats introduced legislation 
that would impose more restrictions than 
Oxley’s proposal             
5  3/7/2002  3/6-3/8 0.0170  0.99  0.95  0.79 0.0151 0.88  0.85  0.70 
   
Bush’s first response to accounting 
scandals unveiled             
6  3/26/2002  3/25-3/27 -0.0030  -0.18  -0.19  -0.17  -0.0037  -0.21  -0.23  -0.20 
   
Greenspan warned against too much 
regulation             
7  4/11/2002  4/11-4/12 -0.0131  -0.93  -0.90  -0.95  -0.0137  -0.97  -0.94  -1.00 
   
House Financial Services Committee 
scheduled to vote Oxley’s bill, but the 
vote  was  postponed             
8  4/16/2002  4/16-4/17 0.0201  1.42  1.44  1.56  0.0188  1.33  1.35  1.47 
  
Oxley’s bill passed in the Committee 
           
9  4/24/2002  Oxley’s bill passed in the House  4/24-4/26 -0.0213  -1.23  -1.05  -1.37  -0.0226  -1.31  -1.11  -1.46 
  4/25/2002             
   
Senate Judiciary Committee approved 
legislation bolstering corporate fraud laws             
10  5/8/2002  5/7-5/9 0.0169  0.98  0.87  0.90 0.0150 0.87  0.77  0.81 
   
Sarbanes circulated his reform bill in the 
Senate Banking Committee             
11  6/11/2002  6/10-6/13 -0.0198  -0.99  -0.76  -0.78  -0.0220  -1.10  -0.84  -0.87 
   
Democrats in Senate Banking Committee 
united behind Sarbanes’ bill             
  6/12/2002             
  
SEC proposed rules to require executives 
to certify financial reports              
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12  6/18/2002  6/18-6/19 -0.0151  -1.07  -0.76  -0.79  -0.0170  -1.21  -0.86  -0.90 
   
Senate Banking Committee passed 
Sarbanes’ bill             
13  6/25/2002  6/25-6/27 -0.0025  -0.15  -0.10  -0.13  -0.0050  -0.29  -0.21  -0.26 
   
WorldCom admitted that they understated 
expenses by $3.8 billion             
14  7/8-7/12  Senate debated Sarbanes’ bill  7/8-7/12 -0.0639 -2.86*** -1.64 -2.00** -0.0680 -3.05*** -1.75*  -2.12** 
  7/9/2002  Bush delivered a speech on corporate 
reforms; passage of Sarbanes’ bill likely             
  7/10/2002             
   
Senate passed a tough amendment to 
strengthen criminal penalties 97 to 0             
15  7/15/2002  Senate passed Sarbanes’ bill  7/15-7/17 -0.0131  -0.76  -0.40  -0.52  -0.0159  -0.92  -0.49  -0.63 
  7/16/2002  House passed bill to strengthen criminal 
penalties             
16 7/18/2002 
House Republican leaders reportedly 
retreated from efforts to dilute the 
Senate’s tough bill 
7/18-7/23 -0.1193 -5.98***  -2.77*** -3.80*** -0.1227 -6.15*** -2.84*** -3.89*** 
 
7/19/2002 
Conference committee started negotiations 
to merge bills and Senate’s bill became the 
framework; negotiation continued over the 
weekend             
  7/20/2002  Bush pushed to speed up rulemaking in a 
radio  address             
  7/23/2002  Lobbyists reportedly lost their impact             
17  7/24/2002  Senate and House agreed on the final rule  7/24-7/26 0.0611  3.54*** 1.91*  1.78*  0.0576 3.34*** 1.80*  1.68* 
  7/25/2002  Senate and House passed SOX             
                      
Tests of cumulative stock returns around the above events                   
       CVWRET  Historical  VIX  Rolling CAR  Historical  VIX Rolling 
Cumulated over all the dates listed above    -0.1600  -2.20**  -1.60  -1.81*  -0.1989  -2.74***  -1.99**  -2.25** 
Cumulated over events associated with significant returns    -0.1524 -4.08***  -2.14**  -2.68***  -0.1639 -4.40*** -2.31** -2.88*** 
Cumulated over July 8 to July 26, 2002     -0.1352  -3.50 -2.54**  -2.21**  -0.1489  -3.86***  -2.80*** -2.43** 





Table 2: Contemporaneous events between July 8 – July 31, 2002 and intraday returns 
This table reports contemporaneous news announcements between July 8 and July 31, 2002. Three categories of news announcements are 
examined: announcements related to legislative activities, accountings scandals, and economic statistics. Panel A describes the contemporary 
events in the period. Panel B presents intraday returns around some of the events. Panel C shows the intraday return patterns of the days examined 
in Panel B. 
 
Panel A: Contemporaneous events in July 2002 
Date  Legislative activities  Accounting scandals  Economics news 
7/8/2002   House Financial Services Committee held 
a hearing of WorldCom – 1 p.m.   
7/9/2002 
House Appropriations Committee voted to deny 




House panel voted against some of the 
President’s proposals regarding the Homeland 
Security bill, but the votes could be overridden 
  
7/11/2002 
Rep. Thomas proposed a bill targeting tax 
shelters, but whether the bill attacks U.S. 
multinationals is arguable 
  Retail sales went up; whole sale price increased by 0.1%; 
labor market stabilized  (Gold, 7/12/02, WSJ) 
 
House panel voted against some of the 
President’s proposals regarding the Homeland 
Security bill, but the votes could be overridden 
  
7/15/2002 
Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman 
Robert Byrd sought to cut spending of the 
Homeland Security bill 
  US dollar fell, but there was no forecast of large fall; US 
business inventory increases by 0.2% (7/16/02, WSJ) 
7/16/2002  
Duke Energy admitted that they inflated 
revenue by $126 million, but the 
accounting problem did not affect earnings 
Greenspan issued optimistic forecast of the economy (Ip, 
7/17/2002, WSJ) 
7/17/2002 
Two bills were drafted by the Select Committee. 
The bills were closer to the President’s 
proposals, overriding some of the previous votes 
of the House Committees 
 
Housing starts fell 3.6% in June. However, building 
permits, a measure of future construction activity, 
increased 1.4%. This increase, combined with 30-year 
fixed-mortgage rates that have stayed below 7% for the 
past several weeks, suggests that the housing market will 




Bush lobbied the House for the trade bill 
The provision to deny future federal contracts to 
firms seeking foreign tax shelters was removed 
from the appropriations bill 
 
The index of leading economic indicators was unchanged; 
first-time applications for unemployment benefits 
declined to a 17-month low in the past week, suggested 
the labor market is continuing to improve (7/19/02, WSJ) 
7/19/2002  The Select Committee considered and approved 
the Homeland Security bill    
7/21/2002   WorldCom CEO said the company would 
file for Chapter 11   
7/22/2002    
Manufacturers benefited from weak dollars; raw-steel 
production by the nation’s mills increased 0.5% in the 
week ended July 20 (7/21/02, WSJ) 
7/23/2002  Bush lobbied the House for the Homeland 
Security bill   
The number of entrepreneurs seeking funding for new 
businesses fell 10% in the second quarter (Whitman, 
7/24/02, WSJ) 
7/24/2002   Adelphia executives were arrested around 
6 a.m.   
7/25/2002    
Durable-goods orders fell in June by 3.8%; Labor 
Department reported a surprisingly steep decline in the 
number of people filing first-time jobless claims. While 
existing-home sales plummeted in June, the Commerce 
Department reported that new-home sales rose 0.5% that 
month (Gavin, 7/26/02, WSJ) 
7/26/2002  The Homeland Security bill passed in the House     






Panel B: Intraday returns 
The method to compute and test the intraday returns is discussed in Appendix 3. The last column of the table, Percentage, reports the market return 
in the interval as a percentage of the pervious-close-to-close return of the day. 
Date  Time of event  Event  Return interval  Return  P-value  Percentage 
7/9/2002  11:20 a.m. – 11:47 a.m.  11:20-11:29  0.0015  0.0970  -7.22% 
  
Bush delivered a speech regarding 
accounting reforms  11:30-11:39 -0.0020  0.0370  9.81% 
     11:40-11:49  -0.0038  0.0140  18.28% 
     11:50-11:59  -0.0007  0.2480  3.16% 
      Previous close – close  -0.0207     
            
7/22/2002  July 21  Previous close – open  -0.0032  0.2490  10.53% 
  
WorldCom announced intention to file for 
Chapter 11 on July 21  Previous close – 9:39  -0.0027  0.2950  8.88% 
      Previous close – close  -0.0304     
            
7/24/2002  July 24, 6 a.m.  Previous close – open  -0.0190  0.0080  -32.82% 
  
Adelphia executives were arrested around 
6 a.m.  Previous close – 9:39  -0.0268  0.0060  -46.29% 
      Previous close – close  0.0579     
            
7/29/2002  July 26/27  Trade bill passed in the House on July 27  Previous close – open  0.0207  0.0010  39.01% 
    Previous close – 9:39  0.0234  0.0010  44.10% 
  
The Homeland Security bill passed in the 
House on July 26         
  11:00 a.m. – 11:31 a.m.  11:00-11:09  -0.0005  0.3580  -1.01% 
   11:10-11:19  -0.0009  0.2340  -1.64% 
   11:20-11:29  -0.0010  0.1780  -1.91% 
  
Bush delivered a speech regarding the 
welfare reform, in which he explicitly 
indicated that he would sign the 
accounting reform bill into law  11:30-11:39 0.0026  0.0380  4.94% 




Panel C: Patterns of intraday returns 
Intraday stock returns are plotted for the four days examined in Panel B. Stock returns are calculated for each ten-minute interval as explained in 
Appendix 3. The horizontal axis represents time and the vertical axis represents the value-weighted market return. The return corresponding to 







































































































































Table 3: Raw and abnormal returns around the legislative events subsequent to SOX 
Abnormal returns (AR) are computed as the difference between the raw value-weighted returns and the expected market returns calculated based 
on model (1) and parameter estimates in Table 1 Panel A. The t-statistics reported in this table are based on the standard deviation of raw returns 
or the prediction errors in the estimation period (Historical), the VIX as of day t-1(VIX), or the standard deviation of predication errors in the 30 
days prior to day t (Rolling). CVWRET and CAR reported together with event descriptions are cumulative raw returns or abnormal returns around 
each event. Statistical tests of cumulative raw or abnormal returns for the whole period are reported at the bottom of the table.   
 
Event 
Number  Date Description Event 
window  CVWRET Historical VIX  Rolling CAR Historical VIX  Rolling 
Implementation of SOX in 2002                   
18 8/14/2002  Deadline for CEOs and CFOs of 947 largest 
firms to certify their financial reports  8/13-8/15 0.0268  1.55  0.98 0.62  0.0226 1.31  0.82  0.52 
19 8/27/2002 
SEC adopted rules to require CEOs and 
CFOs of all public firms to certify their 
financial reports and to accelerate filings of 
statements 
8/26-8/27  -0.0236 -1.36 -0.80  -0.56  -0.0268  -1.56 -0.91  -0.64 
20 10/16/2002  SEC proposed rules concerning sections 404, 
406 and 407 of SOX  10/15-10/18 0.0503  2.52**  1.41  1.17  0.0444 2.22**  1.24  1.11 
 10/18/2002  SEC budget shortage                  
21 10/22/2002  Bush promised to increase the funding of the 
SEC  10/21-10/23 0.0126  0.73  0.41  0.34  0.0086  0.50  0.28  0.25 
22 10/25/2002  Webster named Chairman of the PCAOB  10/24-10/28  -0.0046 -0.26 -0.16  -0.12  -0.0079  -0.46 -0.28  -0.23 
23 10/30/2002 
SEC proposed new disclosure requirement of 
off-balance sheet transactions and pro forma 
information 
10/29-10/31  -0.0026 -0.15 -0.10  -0.07  -0.0071  -0.41 -0.26  -0.21 
24 11/5/2002  SEC Chairman Pitt resigned  11/4-11/7 0.0029  0.15  0.09  0.07  -0.0025  -0.13  -0.08 -0.06 
25 11/12/2002  PCAOB Chairman Webster resigned  11/11-11/13  -0.0124 -0.72 -0.45  -0.37  -0.0161  -0.93 -0.59  -0.51 
26 11/19/2002  SEC proposed auditor independence rule  11/18-11/20 0.0049  0.28  0.21  0.16  0.0009  0.05  0.04  0.03 
Implementation of SOX in 2003                  
27 1/8/2003  SEC proposed listing standards rules  1/7-1/9 -0.0015 -0.09 -0.07  -0.06  -0.0080  -0.46 -0.36  -0.35 
28 1/15/2003 
SEC adopted rules regarding the pro forma 
earnings report, trading during blackout 
periods, and audit committee financial expert 
requirement 
1/14-1/16  -0.0099 -0.57 -0.44  -0.47  -0.0162  -0.94 -0.71  -0.77 
29 1/22/2003  SEC adopted rules on auditor independence 




30 5/21/2003  McDonough named Chairman of the PCAOB  5/20-5/22 0.0127  0.73  0.70 0.72  0.0074 0.43  0.41  0.42 
31 5/27/2003 
SEC adopted rules concerning management’s 
report on internal controls and postponed the 
compliance date 
5/23-5/28 0.0232  1.34  1.27 1.34  0.0180 1.04  0.99  1.03 
32 7/28/2003  PCAOB roundtable meeting; works of 
PCAOB revealed  7/25-7/29 0.0090  0.52  0.53 0.53  0.0068 0.39  0.40  0.40 
33 10/7/2003  PCAOB proposed rules related to section 404  10/6-10/8 0.0059  0.34  0.34 0.38  0.0030 0.17  0.17  0.19 
                  
Tests of cumulative stock returns around all the legislative events related to SOX in 2002 and 2003               
       CVWRET Historical  VIX  Rolling CAR  Historical VIX Rolling 
Cumulated over all the dates listed above    -0.1062  -1.04  -0.74  -0.72  -0.2203  -2.17  -1.54  -1.52 
Cumulated over events associated with significant returns    -0.1925 -4.55***  -2.48** -2.98***  -0.2123 -5.03***  -2.73*** -3.28*** 




Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the sample used in the cross-sectional tests 
 
Panel A: Sample selection procedures 
This table summarizes the sample selection procedure for the cross-sectional tests. Firms are required to 
have daily return data from CRSP, financial data from Compustat, compensation data from Execucomp, 
governance index from IRRC and nonaudit fee data manually collected from proxy statements. 
 
Sample Selection Procedures 
Number of firms with return data from CRSP in 2002   7033 
with financial data from Compustat   6176 
with compensation data from Execucomp in 2001   1596 
with governance index from IRRC in 2002   1432 
with nonaudit fee data for 2001   1409 
 
 
Panel B: Average raw returns of the sample around the events leading to SOX 
This table reports the average raw returns of the sample used in the cross-sectional tests around the 17 
events leading to the passage of SOX. CRAW denotes the average cumulative raw returns around each 
event. The t-statistics are calculated based on the standard deviation of daily average raw returns 
estimated 180 days prior to December 27, 2001 (Historical) or in the 30 days prior to day t (Rolling). 
Detailed description of each event is presented in Appendix 1 and Table 1. 
 
Event 
Number  Date Event  Window  CRAW  Historical  Rolling 
1  1/17/2002  1/15 – 1/18/2002  -0.0117  -0.44  -0.56 
2  2/2/2002  2/1 – 2/42002  -0.0273  -1.45  -1.92* 
3  2/13/2002  2/11 – 2/14/2002  0.0180  0.67  0.81 
4 2/28/2002  2/27-3/1/2002  0.0188 0.82  0.91 
5  3/7/2002  3/6 – 3/8/2002  0.0289  1.25  1.34 
6  3/26/2002  3/25 – 3/27/2002  0.0061  0.27  0.33 
7  4/11/2002  4/11 – 4/12/2002  0.0011  0.06  0.08 
8  4/16/2002  4/16 – 4/17/2002  0.0189  1.00  1.45 
9  4/23/2002  4/22 – 4/26/2002  -0.0187  -1.12  -1.17 
10 5/8/2002  5/7-5/9/2002  0.0082 0.35  0.46 
11  6/11/2002  6/10 – 6/13/2002  -0.0313  -1.18  -1.20 
12  6/18/2002  6/18 – 6/19/2002  -0.0181  -0.96  -0.92 
13 6/25/2002  6/25-6/27/2002  -0.0036  -0.15  -0.18 
14  7/8 2002  7/8 – 7/12/2002  -0.0641  -2.15**  -1.88* 
15  7/15/2002  7/15 – 7/17/2002  -0.0159  -0.69  -0.60 
16  7/18/2002  7/18 – 7/23/2002  -0.1175  -4.42***  -3.79*** 
17  7/24/2002  7/24 – 7/26/2002  0.0488  2.12**  1.52 
          
Tests of cumulative stock returns around the events       
     CRAW  Historical  Rolling 
Cumulated over all the dates listed above  -0.1594  -1.65*  -1.76*  
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Cumulated over events associated with significant returns  -0.1600  -3.21***  -3.43*** 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, two-tailed test. 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of explanatory variables in the cross-sectional tests. Nonaudit 
is calculated as nonaudit fees minus fees paid for tax-related services, deflated by the market value of 
equity of each firm at the end of 2001. Incentive equals the ratio of incentive pay to total compensation of 
the CEO. Gindex is the governance index of IRRC as of 2002. Busi_lines equals the number of four-digit 
SIC industries of each firm. Foreign equals one if foreign currency adjustment is non-zero, zero 
otherwise. MTB denotes the market-to-book ratio, evaluated at the end of 2001. Size equals the logarithm 
of market value of equity at the end of 2001. ROA is return on assets of 2001. Pre_Ret is market-adjusted 





Mean Median  Std  p25  p75 
Nonaudit  (%)  1409  0.0894  0.0352 0.1688 0.0111 0.0899 
Incentive  1409  0.6413  0.7318 0.2833 0.4971 0.8597 
Gindex 1409  9.3563  9  2.5804  8  11 
Busi_lines 1409  3.0291  2  1.9095  2  4 
Foreign 1409  0.2881  0  0.4531  0  1 
MTB  1409  3.0448  2.1559 2.8701 1.4352 3.6166 
Size  1409  7.4084  7.2800 1.5977 6.3452 8.4617 
ROA (%)  1409  0.8953  2.9294  15.0931  -0.1915  6.9345 




Panel D: Pearson correlation 
This table reports the Pearson correlation between variables used in the cross-sectional tests. Correlation 
coefficients that are significantly different from zero at less than 5% level are presented in bold. 
 
  Nonaudit Incentive  Gindex  Busi_lines  Foreign  MTB  Size  ROA 
Nonaudit               
Incentive  -0.1608             
Gindex  0.0185  0.1081           
Busi_Lines  0.0591  0.0148  0.1631        
Foreign  0.0253  0.0695  -0.0302  -0.0195      
MTB  -0.2031 0.2003 -0.0399  -0.0841 0.0538     
Size  -0.3441  0.4329  0.0787 0.2089 0.0595  0.3692    
ROA  -0.1961 0.0796  0.0858  0.0800  -0.0334  0.1746 0.2379   





Table 5: Cross-sectional test of the market reaction to SOX  




jInd a ∑ 0 + a1 Nonauditi + a2 Incentivei + a3 Gindexi + a4 Busi_linesi + a5 Foreigni + a6 Sizei + a7 MTBi + a8 ROAi + a9 Pre_Reti 
+ ei                                 ( 2 )  
Variables are defined as in Appendix 4.  
 
Panel A: Cross-sectional test of the market reaction to SOX – cumulative returns 
Regression (2) is estimated with CAR_3E (cumulative abnormal return around events 14, 16, and 17), CAR_4E (cumulative abnormal return 
around events 2, 14, 16, and 17), CAR_ALL (cumulative abnormal return around events 1 to 17), and CAR_JJ (cumulative abnormal return from 
June 25 to July 26, 2002) as the dependent variable respectively. The coefficients on industry dummies (Indj) are not presented. For each model 
the asymptotic two-tailed OLS p-values and bootstrapped one-tailed p-values are reported. The detailed description of the bootstrapping method 
can be found in footnote 25 on page 29. 
 
     Dependent  Variable 
     CAR_3E CAR_4E  CAR_ALL CAR_JJ 
 Prediction  P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value 









Nonaudit + -  -0.0870 <.0001  0.0330  -0.0817 0.0003  0.0380  -0.0862 0.0161  0.0510  -0.1317 <.0001  0.0090 
Incentive + -  0.0015 0.9127 0.4130  0.0011 0.9391  0.4360  0.0231 0.2972  0.1830  0.0045 0.8118  0.3610 
Gindex +  -  -0.0028 0.0395  0.0700  -0.0028 0.0518  0.0820  -0.0057 0.0107  0.0090  -0.0039 0.0368  0.0500 
Busi_lines   -  -0.0039 0.0461  0.0440  -0.0034 0.1022  0.0580  -0.0082 0.0120  0.0050  -0.0056 0.0437  0.0000 
Foreign   -  -0.0186 0.0184  0.0000  -0.0201 0.0148  0.0040  -0.0149 0.2521  0.1130  -0.0147 0.1827  0.0180 
MTB   -  0.0033 0.0139 0.1020  0.0035 0.0136  0.1090  -0.0002 0.9451  0.4720  0.0045 0.0177  0.0630 
Size     -0.0021 0.4532  0.3180  -0.0034 0.2457  0.2340  0.0036  0.4435  0.3270  0.0033  0.4097  0.3160 
ROA     -0.0014 <.0001  0.0110  -0.0014 <.0001  0.0120  -0.0009 0.0386  0.0510  -0.0026 <.0001  0.0000 
Pre_Ret     -0.0247 <.0001  0.4860  -0.0269 <.0001  0.5770  -0.1202 <.0001  0.0620  -0.0649 <.0001  0.0000 
                        
Adj. R
2  With industry dummies  16.19%    15.41%    18.98%    25.04%  




Panel B: Cross-sectional test of the market reaction to SOX – individual events 
This table presents the estimation results of regression (2) with CAR*S as the dependent variable, where CAR denotes abnormal returns around the 
individual events that are associated with revisions in expectations (events 2, 14, 16, and 17), and S is an indicator variable which equals one for 
events 2, 14, and 16, and minus one for event 17. The coefficients on industry dummies (Indj) are not reported. For each regression, both the 
asymptotic two-tailed OLS p-values and the bootstrapped one-tailed p-values are reported.  
 
      Event 2  Event 14  Event 16  Event 17 
 Prediction  P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value 









Nonaudit + -  0.0053 0.3400 0.4260  0.0011 0.9198  0.5140  -0.0578 <.0001 0.0080  0.0304 0.0210 0.0180 
Incentive + -  -0.0004 0.9089  0.4520  0.0084 0.2265  0.1150  0.0152 0.0932  0.0520  0.0221 0.0067  0.0010 
Gindex +  -  0.0000 0.9373 0.4430  -0.0020 0.0037  0.0240  -0.0036 <.0001 0.0000  -0.0028 0.0006 0.0000 
Busi_lines   -  0.0006 0.2738 0.2360  -0.0034 0.0008  0.0040  -0.0022 0.0940 0.0070  -0.0017 0.1487 0.0290 
Foreign   -  -0.0016 0.4430  0.1990  -0.0047 0.2487  0.0760  -0.0084 0.1134  0.0000  0.0055 0.2554  0.0210 
MTB   -  0.0002 0.6242 0.4000  0.0005 0.4747  0.2580  0.0017 0.0676 0.0260  -0.0012 0.1593 0.1200 
Size     -0.0013 0.0708  0.2270  0.0012 0.4051  0.3510  -0.0034 0.0786  0.0690  0.0000 0.9859  0.4540 
ROA     0.0000 0.6484 0.3940  -0.0013 <.0001  0.0000  -0.0009 <.0001  0.0000  -0.0008 <.0001  0.0010 
Pre_Ret     -0.0022 0.1238  0.8790  -0.0108 0.0001  0.2240  -0.0193 <.0001  0.0000  -0.0054 0.1062  0.0020 
                       
Adj. R
2  With industry dummies  1.76%     24.15%     30.32%      23.74%   




Table 6: Market reactions to the announcement of postponing compliance with Section 404 
This table reports the test of market reactions to the announcement of postponing the compliance dates of 
Section 404. Panel A summarizes the predictions of H6a and H6b. Panel B presents the test results. 
 
Panel A: Summary of predictions 
This panel summarizes the predictions of H6a, which hypothesizes that the postponement is costly as 
it is necessary for firms to tighten their internal controls immediately, and of H6b, which 
hypothesizes that the postponement is beneficial as it reduces the compliance costs, especially for 
firms that obtained a longer extension period. 
Proposed compliance date: fiscal year ending on or after September 15, 2003 
Final compliance dates: Accelerated filers: fiscal year ending on or after June 15, 2004 
       Nonaccelerated filers: fiscal year ending on or after April 15, 2005 
In the empirical tests, firms with a market capitalization lower than $75 million by the end of 2002 
are classified as nonaccelerated filers (see footnote 5 on page 6 for the definition of an accelerated 




















H6a:  Early  >  Late      H6a:  Early  >  Late 





Median Mkt Cap: $509 million 
Nonaccelerated Filers 
1,535 firms 
Median Mkt Cap: $27 million 
Early 
Fiscal year ending 
between June 15 
and September 14 
(unaffected) 
A firm is 
classified into this 
group if its fiscal 
year ends in June, 
July or August 
Late 
Fiscal year ending 
between September 
15 and June 14 (one 
year of extension) 
A firm is classified 
into this group if its 
fiscal year ends in 
months other than 
June, July or August 
Early 
Fiscal year ending 
between April 15 
and September 14 
(one year of 
extension)  
A firm is classified 
into this group if its 
fiscal year ends 
between April and 
August (inclusive)
Late 
Fiscal year ending 
between September 15 
and April 14 (two 
years of extension) 
A firm is classified 
into this group if its 
fiscal year ends 
between January and 
March, or between 
September and 
December (inclusive)  
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Panel B: Regression results 
This panel reports the estimation results of the regression that examines the cross-sectional variation in 
market reactions to the announcement of postponing compliance with Section 404. Foreign firms and 
banks are excluded. The method used to obtain the bootstrapped p-values is similar to the one described 
in footnote 25 on page 29. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
CARi = a0 + a1 Non_Acci + a2 Late_Noni + a3 Late_Acci + a4 MTBi + a5 Sizei + ei   (3) 
 
 
    CAR (-1, 1)  CAR (-3, 1)  CAR (-5, 1) 
  Prediction  P-value P-value P-value 







Intercept    -0.0002  0.9647 0.4950  -0.0092  0.0505 0.3080  -0.0156  0.0059  0.1180 
Non_Acc  ?  -0.0065  0.0844 0.2160  -0.0069  0.1853 0.2320  -0.0105  0.0924  0.1690 
Late_Non  -/+  0.0036 0.2774 0.2160  0.0100 0.0257 0.0620  0.0142 0.0088  0.0370 
Late_Acc  -/+  -0.0020  0.5705 0.2240  0.0059 0.2238 0.1950  0.0039 0.5119  0.3760 
Size  ?  -0.0009  0.1377 0.3510  0.0005 0.5430 0.4170  0.0012 0.2534  0.2630 
MTB  ?  0.0003 0.2623 0.1270  0.0004 0.3386 0.0250  -0.0001  0.8532  0.6830  
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Table 7: Additional test to control for litigation risks 
This table presents the results of the cross-sectional regression (2) after controlling for litigation risks. The 




jInd a ∑ 0  + bk Litigation_Proxies + a1 Nonauditi + a2 Incentivei + a3 Gindexi + a4 
Busi_linesi + a5 Foreigni + a6 Sizei + a7 MTBi + a8 ROAi + a9 Pre_Reti + ei  
Variables are defined in Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics of the litigation variables are reported in Panel 
A. The regression results are reported in Panel B. The coefficients on industry dummies (Indj) are not 
reported. For each model the asymptotic two-tailed OLS p-values are reported. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of litigation variables 
Variable #  of  Observations  Mean Median  Std 
Bankrupt 1232  0.0302  0.0057  0.1291 
Acquisition 1409 0.0234  0.0000  0.1513 
Accrual 1333  -0.0939  -0.0674  0.1345 
 
 
Panel B: Regression results 
   Dependent  Variable 
  Prediction  CAR_3E CAR_4E CAR_ALL CAR_JJ 
  Benefit Cost Estimate  P-value  Estimate  P-value Estimate  P-value  Estimate  P-value 
Nonaudit + -  -0.0908 <.0001 -0.0854 0.0004 -0.0848 0.0255 -0.1312 <.0001 
Incentive + -  -0.0014 0.9264 -0.0013 0.9348 0.0232  0.3390  0.0054  0.7927 
Gindex +  -  -0.0034 0.0270 -0.0035 0.0309 -0.0067 0.0082 -0.0049 0.0253 
Busi_lines   -  -0.0042 0.0775 -0.0037 0.1315 -0.0077 0.0468 -0.0056 0.0928 
Foreign   -  -0.0188 0.0320 -0.0207 0.0234 -0.0204 0.1546 -0.0158 0.1954 
Bankrupt  -  -0.0060 0.9000 -0.0352 0.4805 -0.0348 0.6562 -0.0622 0.3516 
Acquisition   -  0.0268 0.2893 0.0431 0.1024 0.0575 0.1648 0.0268 0.4492 
Accrual   -  -0.1252 0.0078 -0.1568 0.0014 -0.1674 0.0298 -0.1804 0.0062 
MTB   -  0.0024 0.1062 0.0024 0.1340  -0.0023 0.3554 0.0030 0.1506 
Size     -0.0023 0.4682 -0.0028 0.4048 0.0051  0.3360  0.0035  0.4343 
ROA     -0.0005 0.2690 -0.0005 0.3178 0.0001  0.9434 -0.0017 0.0114 
Pre_Ret     -0.0263 <.0001 -0.0285 <.0001 -0.1202 <.0001 -0.0679 <.0001 
                    
Adj. R
2  With industry dummies  17.39%   17.17%   20.25%   26.44% 
  Without industry dummies  10.29%     10.24%     15.04%     18.49% 
 
 